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ABSTRACT
Error Awareness and Apathy in Moderate-to-Severe Traumatic Brain Injury
Dustin M. Logan
Department of Psychology, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury (M/S TBI) is a growing public health concern
with significant impact on the cognitive functioning of survivors. Cognitive control and deficits
in awareness have been linked to poor recovery and rehabilitation outcomes. One way to
research cognitive control is through awareness of errors using electroencephalogram and eventrelated potentials (ERPs). Both the error-related negativity and the post-error positivity
components of the ERP are linked to error awareness and cognitive control processes.
Attentional capacity and levels of apathy influence error awareness in those with M/S TBI.
There are strong links between awareness, attention, and apathy. However, limited research has
examined the role of attention, awareness, and apathy using electrophysiological indices of error
awareness to further understand cognitive control in a M/S TBI sample.
The current study sought to elucidate the role of apathy in error awareness in those with
M/S TBI. Participants included 75 neurologically-healthy controls (divided randomly into two
control groups) and 24 individuals with M/S TBI. All participants completed self-report
measures of mood, apathy, and executive functioning, as well as a brief neuropsychological
battery to measure attention and cognitive ability. To measure awareness, participants completed
the error awareness task (EAT), a modified Stroop go/no-go task. Participants signaled
awareness of errors committed on the previous trial.
The M/S TBI group decreased accuracy while improving or maintaining error awareness
compared to controls over time. There were no significant between-group differences for ERN
and Pe amplitudes. Levels of apathy in the M/S TBI group were included in three multiple
regression analyses predicting proportion of unaware errors, ERN amplitude, and Pe amplitude.
Apathy was predictive of error awareness, although not in the predicted direction. Major
analyses were replicated using two distinct control groups to determine potential sample effects.
Results showed consistent results comparing both control groups to a M/S TBI group.
Findings show variable levels of awareness and accuracy over time for those with M/S
TBI when compared to controls. Conclusions include varying levels of attention and awareness
from the M/S TBI group over time, evidenced by improving awareness of errors when they are
happening, but an inability to regulate performance sufficiently to improve accuracy. Levels of
apathy are playing a role in error awareness, however, not in predicted directions. The study
provides support for the role of attentional impairments in error awareness and encourages future
studies to look for varying levels of performance within a given task when using populations
linked to elevated levels of apathy and attentional deficits.
Keywords: traumatic brain injury (TBI), apathy, cognitive control, event-related potential (ERP),
error-related negativity (ERN), post-error positivity (Pe), error awareness task (EAT)
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1
Error Awareness and Apathy in Moderate-to-Severe Traumatic Brain Injury

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) and its effects are now a leading cause of death and
disability in many countries (Koskinen & Alaranta, 2008; Kumar et al., 2009; Myburgh et al.,
2008). In the United States alone, there are between 1.5 and 2.5 million TBIs each year
(Beauchamp, Mutlak, Smith, Shohami, & Stahel, 2008; Hall, DeFrances, Williams, Golosinskiy,
& Schwartzman, 2010), with a total cost of over $60 billion annually (K. L. Davis, Joshi,
Tortella, & Candrilli, 2007; Gamboa, Holland, & Tierney, 2006; Woolhandler & Himmelstein,
2007; Wrona, 2006). Reports indicate that 19% of United States (U.S.) military personnel who
have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan meet criteria for a TBI (Campbell et al., 2009). Indeed,
between the years 2001 and 2007, 320,000 U.S. service men and women showed some effects of
a TBI, ranging from mild symptoms to severe injury (Maruta, Lee, & Jacobs, 2010).
Approximately 1.1% of the U.S. civilian population (3.17 million people) also live with some
degree of TBI-related disability (Zaloshnja, Miller, Langlois, & Selassie, 2008).
The severity and types of disability following TBI vary depending on location of injury,
extent of injury, and premorbid functioning (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012). In most
TBIs, it is common to see diffuse axonal injury (DAI), or shearing of the white matter tracts, that
can globally affect functioning (Dockree & Robertson, 2011; Maruta et al., 2010). Specific focal
lesions in combination with global DAI may result in deficits in many areas of behavioral,
emotional, cognitive, and executive domains (Bigler & Maxwell, 2012; Smith, Hicks, &
Povlishock, 2013). Self-awareness and apathy are two commonly affected areas of functioning
in those with moderate-to-severe (M/S) TBI (Lane-Brown & Tate, 2011). Although both
awareness and apathy have been studied individually in this population there is very limited
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information about the potential interaction of awareness and apathy in individuals with M/S TBI.
Further, the neural mechanisms underlying both error awareness deficits and apathy following
TBI are poorly understood.
TBI and Awareness
Awareness of behaviors, emotions, and cognitions is often affected following M/S TBI
(Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery, & Schwartz, 1998; Hart, Seignourel, & Sherer, 2009; Lanham,
Weissenburger, Schwab, & Rosner, 2000; Port, Willmott, & Charlton, 2002; Sherer & Hart,
2003; Sherer et al., 1998). Individuals with M/S TBI often have difficulty recognizing their
behavior and how functional deficits in behavior are connected to potential environmental
problems (Dockree & Robertson, 2011). For example, repeating mistakes, committing social
faux pas, and forgetting everyday tasks such as locking doors or taking medications are more
commonly reported in individuals who have experienced a M/S TBI than in non-injured
individuals (Dockree & Robertson, 2011). When awareness is present, those with M/S TBI are
consistently more aware of their physical deficits than deficits associated with emotions,
behaviors, and cognitions (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991). Poor behavioral, emotional, or
cognitive awareness decreases chances for a successful outcome in the areas of rehabilitation
(Lam, McMahon, Priddy, & Gehred-Schultz, 1988), vocational functioning (Sherer et al., 2002;
Wise, Ownsworth, & Fleming, 2005), independence (Trudel, Tryon, & Purdum, 1998), and
considerably increases the level of caregiver distress (Arnould, Rochat, Azouvi, & Linden, 2013;
Hanks, Rapport, & Vangel, 2007; Nonterah et al., 2013)
Hart et al. (1989) suggested that error-related awareness research is a possible way to
further understand the impact that TBI-related awareness deficits have relative to broader
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive functioning. Crosson et al. (1989) put forth a pyramidal
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model of levels of awareness that explains how awareness of specific deficits may be related to
more general and broad self-awareness (see Figure 1). The first and most basic level of
awareness is intellectual awareness: a person’s ability to recognize his or her own impaired
functioning. This may include a basic understanding that an individual is having difficulty in
specific areas or a higher understanding of common errors in day-to-day functioning. For
example, those with M/S TBI might be aware they have trouble remembering important things or
they struggle to understand things people say. Higher-level intellectual awareness is necessary to
understand the implications of the deficits. Examples of higher-level awareness may include
people who can no longer remember directions to places must understand that they can no longer
drive or travel unassisted or that someone with visual-spatial deficits may not be able to continue
work in a graphics art field.

Figure 1. A pyramidal representation of awareness. Intellectual awareness is at the base and emergent awareness
and anticipatory awareness build upon it. Anticipatory awareness requires some degree of intellectual Awareness.
Adapted from “Awareness and Compensation in Postacute Head Injury Rehabilitation,” by B. Crosson, 1989, The
Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 4, p. 47. Copyright 1989 by Aspen Publishers.

Crosson et al. (1989) described intellectual awareness as based on concrete knowledge
about the injury with two potential sources for its deficiency. A lack of knowledge is often seen
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in situations where families and caregivers of those with M/S TBI do not have enough
information about the symptoms and deficits they are seeing in the person with the injury so they
attribute those deficits to laziness or other character traits. The other potential source is the brain
pathology. Deficits in abstract reasoning from frontal lesions or DAI may make it difficult for
the person to generalize understanding of deficits to other situations or environments. For
example, Crosson et al. (1989) explain that a person with impaired abstract reasoning may only
understand their deficits at a concrete level and in the context of a single situation. As such, they
may be unable to generalize awareness of a situational impairment, leading to difficulty in
spontaneously compensating in other environments or situations. Additionally, deficits in
memory from basal forebrain or temporal lesions can decrease intellectual awareness that is
based on learned behaviors from past experiences (Crosson et al., 1989).
The second level of the pyramid described by Crosson et al. (1989) is the person’s ability
to detect deficits as they are happening. This type of awareness is termed emergent awareness
and relies on the person’s ability to know they have deficits (intellectual awareness). Individuals
with emergent awareness deficits are unable to detect problems as they occur due to difficulty in
monitoring relationships between the environment and their actions. On a clinical level those
with emergent awareness deficits are difficult to treat because they may have an understanding of
their deficits and the consequences of them, but will continue to make the same mistakes and not
apply compensatory strategies in the moment due to unawareness of the emerging issue.
Individuals with emergent awareness problems typically require frequent external reminders
from others telling them that a problem or deficit is occurring at that time.
The third level, anticipatory awareness, is a person’s ability to predict when there will be
difficulties as a result of their deficits (Crosson et al., 1989). Being able to anticipate difficulties
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requires knowledge of the deficit (intellectual awareness) and awareness that the problem is
occurring (emergent awareness.). Thus, anticipatory awareness builds on the other two levels.
Deficits in anticipatory awareness impact the person’s ability to initiate compensatory strategies
once they are aware a known deficit is occurring. The individual with poor anticipatory
awareness likely does not realize beforehand that application of a proven strategy can reduce the
chances of problems related to their deficit(s).
The three levels of awareness become important to processing errors and error awareness
in that those with M/S TBI can be affected at all three levels of awareness (Crosson et al., 1989).
Error awareness takes all three levels into account through the process of being able to detect a
conflict (intellectual awareness), recognize an error was made (emergent awareness), and take
steps to ameliorate potential consequences by adjusting performance (anticipatory awareness).
Individuals with M/S TBI seem to have the most difficulty with the later two levels of awareness
in that they struggle to consciously detect having made an error and, thus, their anticipatory or
compensatory responses are affected (Dockree & Robertson, 2011).
A secondary aspect related to error awareness in those with M/S TBI that plays a role in
error detection is that of sustained attention (McAvinue, O'Keeffe, McMackin, & Robertson,
2005). Sustained attention is the ability to maintain mindful, conscious processing of repetitive,
non-arousing stimuli whose qualities would otherwise lead to habituation and distraction over
time (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, & Baddeley, 1997). Sustained attention tasks include those
that require detection of targets that occur infrequently over a long period of time. Individuals
with M/S TBI typically have impaired performance on such tasks (Whyte, Polansky, Fleming,
Coslett, & Cavallucci, 1995; Wilkins, Shallice, & McCarthy, 1987) most likely related to
difficulty in allocating attentional resources to task requirements prior to the application of
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awareness levels. Additionally, individuals with M/S TBI have difficulty with tasks requiring
continuous performance of sustained attention that require maintenance of response sets (e.g.,
sustained attention to frequent approach targets) and inhibition to infrequent avoidance targets
(Chan, 2001; Robertson et al., 1997).
Error awareness and sustained attention processes have been connected through both
physiological and theoretical means. First, fMRI data shows that both error awareness and
sustained attention are executive processes that come from two distinct systems believed to have
frontally-mediated connections (Westerhausen et al., 2010). Error awareness, as part of
cognitive control has strong connections to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortices (Holroyd et al., 2004b; Hughes & Yeung, 2011; Yeung & Cohen, 2010;
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004), while sustained attention is related to a frontal-parietal
system that also involves the ACC (Westerhausen et al., 2010). Second, visual attention and
awareness were described as separate but interconnected processes (Lamme, 2003). Lamme
(2003) indicated that there are two types of consciousness or awareness: phenomenal
consciousness and access awareness. He noted that most sensory stimuli are part of our
phenomenal consciousness, which is short-lived and vulnerable to degradation. A small number
of stimuli reach a stable level of access awareness where we are consciously aware of and able to
report about the stimuli. Lamme (2003) theorized that the process that determines whether a
stimulus moves from a phenomenal level to one of awareness is attention. Sustained attention,
as an aspect of cognitive control, involves performance monitoring and evaluation of processing.
Error awareness is the process of monitoring one’s current performance in relation to a goal and
detecting discrepancy between current and desired performance. McAvinue et al. (2005)
demonstrated significant correlations between sustained attention and error awareness showing
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that sustained attention is an executive process critical for the maintenance of error awareness.
Across situations where the levels of awareness are applied, individuals with TBI have
reduced error awareness compared to controls (Hart et al., 1998; O'Keeffe, Dockree, &
Robertson, 2004). Similarly, when error awareness is tested, there is a correlated reduction in
sustained attention when comparing those with TBI to controls (McAvinue et al., 2005).
Decreased sustained attention has been found in those with severe TBI (Slovarp, Azuma, &
LaPointe, 2012). The reduction in error awareness and sustained attention seen in those with
M/S TBI relates back to their difficulty in treatment and rehabilitation efforts to recognize
deficits as they occur and to apply learned strategies to prevent increased functional problems. A
further understanding of error awareness and the factors related to it may lead to more effective
treatment and rehabilitation techniques, specifically in the areas of improving awareness of
deficits, which in turn may be associated with improved post-injury outcomes. One factor
related to error awareness and sustained attention that plays a significant role in error recognition
and monitoring is negative affect and specifically apathy and anhedonia (Bressan & Crippa,
2005; M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009; M. J. Larson, Fair, Farrer, & Perlstein, 2011; Olvet, Klein,
& Hajcak, 2010).
Apathy
Apathy is one aspect often associated with M/S TBI that may have an influence on levels
of self-awareness. Apathy is conventionally defined as the absence of emotion, feeling, concern,
and motivation (van der Wurff et al., 2003). Marin (1990) criticized this traditional definition as
being too broad, in that it is possible to experience high levels of negative emotion, as can be the
case in those with M/S TBI, but still lack motivation and initiative in most functional areas.
Similarly, those with depression are often seen as apathetic, but commonly experience much
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emotional pain and concern about their welfare and that of others. Marin gave a more consistent
definition of apathy as a primary loss of motivation that is not affected by other factors related to
consciousness, intellect, or emotional distress (Marin, 1990; 1996). A more recent paper
proposed separate diagnostic criteria for apathy that includes a loss or diminished motivation
from previous levels in two of three areas: behavior, cognition, and/or emotion that results in
significant functional impairment and can be observed by the person themselves or by others
(Arnould et al., 2013; Mulin et al., 2011).
Those with apathy, regardless of etiology, demonstrate symptoms of diminished
motivation that are separate from and can not be attributed to emotional distress, cognitive
impairment, or a decreased level of consciousness (Marin, 1990). Individuals with high levels of
apathy are less able to formulate plans and goals, initiate and sustain behaviors, and to react to
positive or negative stimuli in an emotional manner (Rao, Spiro, Schretlen, & Cascella, 2007).
Such deficits make rehabilitation and improvements in functioning very difficult, particularly
among those with M/S TBI (Lane-Brown & Tate, 2011). Those with M/S TBI who experience
apathy are typically less engaged in rehabilitation activities and tend to have less appreciation for
their functional gains. They are less interested in day-to-day activities and show a lack of ability
to plan and develop future goals (Rao et al., 2007). This lack of functional behavior in turn leads
to reduced vocational achievement (Prigatano & Fordyce, 1986) and overall decline in coping
(Finset & Andersson, 2000).
Apathy following M/S TBI is rather prevalent (Starkstein & Pahissa, 2014). van
Reekum, Stuss & Ostrander (2005) found that prevalence of apathy following M/S TBI was
between 46.4% and 71.1%. Arnould, et al. (2013), in a recent review, found that an average of
48% (n = 554) of TBI participants were described as apathetic. In another study, those who had
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focal frontal lesions apathy prevalence was as high as 89.3% (van Reekum, Stuss, & Ostrander,
2005). One concern with trying to study apathy is that apathy is often comorbid with depression.
For example, one study reported apathy being comorbid with depression in 83% of M/S TBI
cases with only 17% having apathy without depression (Kant, Duffy, & Pivovarnik, 1998).
Apathy has often been included as a symptom of depression in depression-related
measures (Lane-Brown & Tate, 2009a; Marin, 1990; 1996; Marin, Firinciogullari, & Biedrzycki,
1993). Several researchers propose that apathy be considered a distinct syndrome and give
diagnostic criteria to support their assertion (Marin, 1990; Mulin et al., 2011; Rao et al., 2007;
Starkstein, 2008; Starkstein & Pahissa, 2014). Apathy-focused research in M/S TBI has
demonstrated specific effects on cognitive functioning beyond the mood-related features of
depression including the decreased ability to formulate plans for goal attainment, initiate the
plan, and then cease activity when the goal is achieved (Lane-Brown & Tate, 2011). Apathy was
distinguished from depression in a brain-injured population in that depression was related to
affective and somatic symptoms while apathy was related to cognitive symptoms (Finset &
Andersson, 2000). Finset and Andersson (2000) found that anhedonia and reduced initiative
were common between both depression and apathy. Kant et al. (1998) found that in those with
closed head injuries, apathy is pathophysiologically different than depression. Apathy is more
likely a result of left inferior, medial, and superior frontal regions, insula, anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), and anterior temporal paralimbic areas including the amygdala and its related
subcortical structures as well as white matter tracts including the corona radiate and the corpus
callosum (Cummings, 1993; Duffy, 1997; Knutson et al., 2013; Marin, 1996).
The perceived overlap between apathy and depression can be linked to the use of apathyrelated items in many, if not all, of the most frequently used depression scales (Levy &
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Cummings, 1998). Apathy symptoms that commonly overlap with depression on such scales
include psychomotor slowing, social inactivity, and decreased interest levels. In addition,
overlap may be due to similar neural circuits (i.e., ACC, prefrontal cortex, amygdala) being
involved in cognitive control and affective regulation (Cummings, 1993; Duffy, 1997; Marin,
1996).
In addition to a difference in physiological lesion location being found in TBI patients,
apathy is a distinct syndrome and more common than depression in those with Huntington’s,
Parkinson’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases (Kirsch-Darrow, Fernandez, Marsiske, Okun, & Bowers,
2006; Landes, Sperry, & Strauss, 2005; Naarding, Janzing, Eling, van der Werf, & Kremer,
2009). In Huntington’s disease patients, studies indicate that apathy was related to cognitive
deterioration and functional declines, but depression was not (Naarding et al., 2009). All of
these disorders, including TBI, commonly affect the frontal areas of the brain as well as the
subcortical limbic areas with the cingulate cortex being the linking neural connection between
the two areas (Cummings, 1993; Lezak et al., 2012; Stuss, van Reekum, & Murphy, 2000).
As the ACC and the prefrontal cortex are highly involved in the processes of evaluation
and regulation of cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Kerns,
Cohen, MacDonald, & Cho, 2004), deficits related to apathy may alter a person’s ability to
detect errors and monitor performance. Similarly, apathy has been related to other
neurobehavioral deficits in impulse control connected to cognitive control and performance
monitoring (Ciurli, Formisano, Bivona, Cantagallo, & Angelelli, 2011). The neural connection
between apathy and performance monitoring becomes important due to the high rates of apathy
in those with conditions that affect the anterior subcortical nuclei and frontal cortical areas such
as TBI, Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, and Alzheimer’s (Andersson, Gundersen, & Finset, 1999a).
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Apathy has been linked to deficits in sustained attention with studies in older adults
suggesting that greater variability in reaction times on sustained attention tasks is a significant
predictor of a lack of perseverance, or the ability to maintain task focus when a task is boring or
difficult (Arnould et al., 2013; Rochat et al., 2013). The Rochat et al. (2013) study used the
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) where participants must withhold responses to
infrequent and unpredictable stimuli while maintaining rapid responses to frequent approach
stimuli (Robertson et al., 1997). The SART has been validated as sensitive to deficits in
sustained attention following TBI (Dockree et al., 2004; McAvinue et al., 2005). Arnould et al.
(2013) concluded that attentional difficulties could be a significant contributor to apathy due to
loss of interest as part of a progressive attentional disengagement resulting in a compromise of
task and goal achievement. Arnould et al. (2013) found group difference between a severe TBI
group and controls on measures of performance maintenance (i.e., response times) for both initial
task performance and rate of performance deterioration over time. They characterized the group
differences as waning responsiveness, increasing response times, and response time variability,
concluding that the changes in performance were consistent with attentional lapses and decreased
arousal level (Arnould et al., 2013). They implicated apathy as the source of decreased arousal
leading to the attentional lapses (Arnould et al., 2013). As previously shown, there is a
significant relationship between attention and error awareness.
If, as suggested, apathy does influence attentional ability, then apathy may also influence
overall error awareness as all three components (apathy, attention, and error awareness) are
connected physiologically through medial frontal structures and neural connections and have
significant evidence supporting their associations. Through a more thorough understanding of
the neurophysiologic manifestations of apathy I hoped to be able to inform future research aimed
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at improving treatment and outcomes in general error awareness and performance monitoring for
those with these debilitating conditions. Especially in those with M/S TBI, it is important to
understand how apathy affects cognitive processes so as to assist in improved awareness of
deficits and regulation of functioning in this growing population.
Electroencephalogram and Event-Related Potentials
Neurophysiologic markers of error awareness and performance monitoring can be
measured using electroencephalogram (EEG) and scalp-recorded event-related potentials
(ERPs). Electroencephalography was first used in the late 1800s on studies with animals and
was later employed for use with humans in the early 20th century (Luck, 2005; Niedermeyer &
da Silva, 2012; Swartz & Goldensohn, 1998). Electroencephalography has developed into the
premier technology for studying automatic processes in the human brain including error
awareness and performance monitoring due to the capability of measuring brain activity at a
millisecond level and employment of both stimulus and response-locked recording (Luck, 2005;
Niedermeyer & da Silva, 2012; Swartz & Goldensohn, 1998). The brain has an electrical charge
that is maintained by billions of neurons. Neurons transport charged ions of either potassium or
sodium across their membranes. When the ions are moved they can push or pull like-charged
ions with them creating waves of electric currents in a process called volume conduction. When
the waves come into contact with the scalp, the ions interact with the metal in the EEG electrodes
and this change in voltage can then be measured. Looking at the differences between electrode
sites over time produces the EEG recording.
The main neurological source for acquiring EEG data is the pyramidal neurons that
comprise about 85% of the cortex. Pyramidal neurons are ideal for electrophysiological
recording as their axons are oriented perpendicular to the cortical surface (Davidson & Jackson,
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2000). Even so, the electric potential of a single neuron is too small to be detected by EEG. The
simultaneous excitation of thousands or even millions of neurons in a similar spatial orientation
is required for the electrical potential to be recorded (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006). Even with the
simultaneous firing of multiple pyramidal neurons, the electrical activity must be amplified to
provide a visual signal of the waveforms.
Event-related potentials are used to better understand the neural functioning of patients or
research participants. Data from EEG is very complex as it consists of electrical signals from
hundreds of neural sources collected through sensors placed on the scalp. Embedded within the
EEG data are electrical neural responses associated with specific time-locked cognitive, sensory,
and motor events. Specific events can be isolated and extracted from the EEG data through a
process of averaging (Luck, 2005). The extracted data are seen as specific waveforms of varying
amplitude, latency, and polarity and are generally called ERPs as they are electrical potentials
associated with specific events (Luck, 2005).
Event-related potentials are patterns of neural activity that are time-locked to either the
presentation of a stimulus or to a response. In order to isolate the ERP signals it is necessary to
filter out as much “noise” as possible from the recorded signal (Talsma, 2005). Noise can come
from many different sources in the environment or from the person themselves in the form of eye
blinks, movement, or forming circuits with objects that conduct electricity (Fabiani, Gratton, &
Coles, 2000). As such, techniques have been developed that average data across multiple trials
and filter out “noisy data.” These methods provide for a higher signal-to-noise ratio and allow
for a cleaner picture of the ERPs that are being examined. Each type of ERP of a particular
amplitude and latency corresponds to specific neural reactions to environmental stimuli, either
external or internal (Luck, 2005). This study focused on two particular ERP components that
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have been linked to error-awareness and performance monitoring in cognitive control: the posterror positivity (Pe) and the error-related negativity (ERN).
Post-error positivity (Pe). An important ERP component related to error awareness and
performance monitoring is the Pe. The Pe is a positive deflection in the ERP occurring 300-500
milliseconds following an error (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Overbeek,
Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005b). Using low resolution electromagnetic tomography
(LORETA) techniques on EEG data the Pe component was localized to the rostral portion of the
ACC (Herrmann, Römmler, Ehlis, & Heidrich, 2004). However, there seems to be
heterogeneous opinion about the actual source of the Pe, with most sources supporting a medialparietal/ACC origination (Carter & Van Veen, 2007; Hester, Foxe, Molholm, & Shpaner, 2005;
O'Connell et al., 2007; Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010; Wessel, Danielmeier,
& Ullsperger, 2011). Error awareness, which has been consistently associated with the Pe
component, was specifically related to a principal component analysis-derived centro-parietal
subcomponent of the Pe (Endrass, Klawohn, Gruetzmann, Ischebeck, & Kathmann, 2012a). In a
substantial review of the literature, Overbeek et al. (2005) gave several hypotheses providing
insight into the functional significance of the Pe. Hypotheses include the affective-processing,
behavior-adaptation, and the error-awareness hypotheses.
The affective processing hypothesis states that error awareness has emotional correlates
and the neuroaffective processes involved in the emotional appraisal of the error is reflected on
the scalp as the Pe. The basis for this hypothesis is a study demonstrating that those who made
more errors had smaller Pe amplitudes than those who made fewer mistakes (Falkenstein et al.,
2000). Falkenstein et al. (2000) somewhat reluctantly concluded that those with more errors had
smaller Pe amplitudes than those with fewer errors because the emotional significance of errors
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was reduced when making more errors resulting in decreased component amplitudes. However,
findings related to the affective processing hypothesis have not been replicated in other studies
showing that subjects with high negative affect had smaller amplitude Pe components (Hajcak &
McDonald, 2003; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004). There is limited support for the
affective processing hypothesis based on failure to replicate the initial findings, as well as
considerable debate about the neural source of the Pe and its connection to other known emotionrelated structures following more recent fMRI studies (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof,
2005b).
The behavioral adaptation hypothesis defines the Pe as being a representation of
conscious changes in behavior to apply more resources to conflict detection and adaption to
avoid erroneous responses on future trials (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005b).
Behavior adaptation is most commonly thought of through the exposition of post-error slowing.
Post-error slowing is a phenomenon where after an error has been committed, the response times
for succeeding trials will slow, presumably as part of a system to reduce the number of errors by
applying more resources and attention to the task at hand. Studies have demonstrated that this
post-error slowing only occurs following an aware-error signaled by an amplified Pe
(Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001), and others have demonstrated that
post-error slowing occurs following an amplified ERN (Debener, 2005; Gehring, Goss, & Coles,
1993). Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof (2005) suggested that, as a solution to this
discrepancy, there are potentially two parallel systems that can signal a need for increased
attention and resources depending on the type of error-response needed. The first system would
be a rapid preconscious signal generated in the ACC that is seen on scalp-generated EEG as the
ERN. The second, a slower system that responds to error salience and evaluates the significance

16
of the error, can be seen on the scalp as the Pe. The amplitude of the Pe has been attributed to
the motivational salience of the error (Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009), meaning that
the more salient the error is the greater the amplitude of the Pe. Behavioral adaptation theory is a
plausible explanation as to why those with ACC, and particularly rostral-cingulate zone, lesions
still have intact post-error slowing especially when the errors have more salience as seen in
Stroop and go/no-go tasks (Ridderinkhof et al., 2009).
The most accepted hypothesis of the functional significance of the Pe is that of error
awareness. The error awareness hypothesis reflects that the Pe is a representation of conscious
error awareness in that the amplitude of the waveform covaries with the degree of awareness of
the error (Dockree & Robertson, 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 2007).
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) demonstrated greater Pe amplitudes for errors participants detected
when compared to undetected errors on an antisaccade (eye movement) task involving
participants being told to move their eyes towards a target stimulus, but were cued with a
distractor on 50% of trials. The participants were asked to signal if they made an eye movement
towards the distractor cue with Pe components compared for errors they signaled and errors they
were unaware of, but were recorded as saccades. Further evidence in support of this theory
comes from findings showing that the salience of error-inducing information is positively
correlated with Pe amplitude (Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). Variation
found with error awareness indicated that the component was sensitive to the salience of an error
and that salience secondarily may trigger error awareness (Endrass, Klawohn, Preuss, &
Kathmann, 2012b; O'Connell et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010).
Questions still remain as to whether the Pe component is the actual expression of error
awareness or if it represents processes that lead to conscious error awareness (Overbeek,
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Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005b). More complexity underlying the significance of the Pe
comes from data showing that the Pe is found not only for aware errors, but also for responses
where the respondent was unsure of the accuracy of their response (Hewig, Coles, Trippe, Hecht,
& Miltner, 2011).
The Pe, as far as it can be attributed to conscious error-awareness, can be generalized to
represent conscious performance awareness beyond just error awareness on task completion (M.
J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009; M. J. Larson, Kaufman, Kellison, Schmalfuss, & Perlstein, 2009;
Wessel et al., 2011). A similar Pe to controls was found in those with M/S TBI and is more
elevated when a person is aware that they have made an error compared to when they are
unaware that the error was committed (Dockree & Robertson, 2011; Endrass, Reuter, &
Kathmann, 2007; M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009). Pe amplitude is decreased in those with
severe depression, which has been attributed to apathy (Schrijvers et al., 2009). The connection
of apathy with Pe amplitude combined with the findings of Pe amplitude being correlated with
motivational salience of errors (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005b), and the high
prevalence of apathy in M/S TBI provides impetus for the use of the Pe as a strong measure of
potential effects that apathy has on the ability of those with M/S TBI to detect errors in
performance. Given that survivors of M/S TBI have higher levels of apathy, apathy is linked to
decreased Pe amplitude, and that Pe amplitude is correlated with error monitoring, I used the Pe
component as an electrophysiological measure of error awareness.
Error-related negativity (ERN). The ERN is a response-locked, negative deflection in
the ERP that occurs 50-100 milliseconds following an error (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann,
& Blanke, 1991). Based on studies involving source localization (Hughes & Yeung, 2011;
Yeung & Cohen, 2010) including dipole modeling techniques (Dehaene & Posner, 1994) and
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functional imaging (Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007) the ERN is generated in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) with connections to the anterior insular cortex (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
There are two main theories of the functional significance of the ERN: the reinforcement
learning theory and the conflict monitoring theory. The reinforcement learning theory is based
on previous research supporting a link between the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex. The
basal ganglia is involved in prediction of whether ongoing events will turn out to be better or
worse than expected (Barto, 1995; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995; Montague, Dayan, &
Sejnowski, 1996). The basal ganglia send phasic signals in the form of positive or negative error
messages based on whether the outcome is predicted to be better or worse to the frontal cortex
and then back to the basal ganglia through the dopamine system (Schultz, 1998; 2002). An error,
in which a person responds in a way contrary to goals is described as an unexpected event
associated with a lack of expected reinforcement following a response. The reinforcement
learning theory of the ERN uses this same theoretical framework to suggest that the ACC
interacts with the dopamine system to enhance task performance (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The
ACC is thought to act as a filter between the different neural sources from which it receives
motor commands (e.g. prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal, amygdala). Through this process the
ACC uses the dopamine system to optimize and select which of the sources will be best suited to
control the motor system and reinforces that selection for future utilization of the most
appropriate resource given a particular situation (Schultz, 1998; 2002). The amplitude of the
ERN is then modulated by phasic shifts of either more dopamine (things are better than
expected) producing a smaller ERN, or less dopamine (things are worse than expected)
producing a larger ERN (Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, & Mars, 2004a). Thus, when a person makes
an error, negative reinforcement learning signals are sent to the ACC in the form of the ERN
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component, resulting in improved motor control through more efficient resource allocation. As
such, unpredicted errors and error feedback produce the ERN in the ACC.
A second theory of the role of the ERN is the conflict monitoring theory. The conflict
monitoring theory predicts that the ERN signals response conflict and represents a precursor to
conscious error detection (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). The conflict monitoring theory suggests
that the ACC is involved in the detection of concurrent but incompatible representations in the
environment (Carter & Van Veen, 2007). The conflict monitoring theory holds that the ERN is
the product of ACC activation as it detects conflict in the environment and calls for greater
resources from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This call for resources then provides increased
attentional capacity to handle the conflict and adjust performance as needed (Carter & Van Veen,
2007; Yeung & Cohen, 2010). The conflict monitoring theory posits that the ERN is a reflection
of the dynamics of response conflict and selection and not just that of error detection or
prediction (Hughes & Yeung, 2011).
Multiple studies manipulating response conflict by altering attention to competing stimuli
support the conflict monitoring theory and suggest that greater attention to the target stimulus
(i.e., correct response option), and not error detection alone, is related to ERN amplitude. For
example, Hughes and Yeung (2011) altered the degree of response conflict by comparing trials
during a conflict condition (on a traditional flanker task) to trials during a masked condition
(using masked congruent flanker trials to manipulate the level of attention to the target stimulus).
A flanker is a task where participants see a stimulus arrow with arrows on either side pointing in
a congruent direction as the center arrow (<<<<<) or an incongruent direction (<<><<).
Participants are to signal which direction the center stimulus arrow is facing. There were no
behavioral (measured through response times and accuracy) differences between conditions, but
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ERN amplitudes were significantly greater for errors committed in the conflict condition
compared to the masked condition, suggesting that the ERN is sensitive to changes in the amount
of attention to the conflict stimulus during the response selection process.
Several studies have demonstrated that changes in ERN amplitude reflect manipulations
in levels of response conflict. For example, Stahl and Gibbons (2007) measured ERN amplitude
differences based on variations in the stimulus onset asynchrony on a stop-signal task,
hypothesizing that conflict would increase with increased delays in the presentation of the stop
signal due to increased attention to the correct response option that then conflicts with the
incorrect response. The authors observed a larger ERN for correct response trials (long-delay
stopped trails) relative to error trials (short-delay non-stopped trials), not only adding further
evidence that the ERN is not an index of error detection, but also providing evidence that the
ERN is sensitive to dynamic changes in conflicting responses due to increased attention to the
conflicting correct response option. Danielmeier, Wessel, Steinhauser, and Ullsperger (2009)
and Maier, Pellegrino, and Steinhauser (2012) also observed a larger ERN for errors in which
flanker stimuli were spaced farther apart and when flankers were larger in size, respectively,
indicating that ERN amplitude is related to the degree of attention to the target stimulus. When
flankers were located far from the target stimulus or were smaller, less attention was directed to
the flankers and more attention was directed to the correct-response target. Thus, when an error
occurred there was greater conflict between the correct and incorrect response options leading to
larger ERN amplitudes. Similarly, following enhancements of cognitive control on high-conflict
trials, subsequent errors are associated with larger ERN amplitude, reflective of greater attention
to target stimulus following recruitment of attentional processes to improve task performance
(M. J. Larson, Clayson, & Baldwin, 2012b). That is, ERN amplitudes are more negative on
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errors committed on incongruent trials preceded by incongruent trials compared to errors on
incongruent trials that were preceded by congruent trials, suggesting enhanced detection of
conflict between the correct target stimulus and committed erroneous response. Together, ERN
amplitudes are sensitive to changes in the amount of conflict between the correct and incorrect
response options, not solely the detection of an error.
Using current research explaining the Pe and ERN components, it is possible to gain a
better understanding of performance monitoring and error awareness. Although thought to
reflect only unconscious error detection or conflict and to be unconnected to the Pe (Hughes &
Yeung, 2011), the ERN was shown to be affected by conscious error awareness in an antisaccade
task (Wessel et al., 2011). The Wessel (2011) and Hughes and Young (2011) studies also
demonstrated that when an error was committed and a larger ERN was produced the response
time for the person to signal that they recognized they made an error was significantly shorter. A
change in response time demonstrates, perhaps, that a larger ERN represents more certainty in
the assessment of the conflict or error made, that is then shown by a quicker conscious response
to signal the error commission and is also represented in a larger Pe (Wessel et al., 2011).
Results are contradictory regarding whether error awareness is necessary for the generation of an
ERN. Several studies indicate no differences in ERN amplitude based on conscious error
awareness (Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011; Endrass et al., 2007; Endrass, Franke, &
Kathmann, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 2007), suggesting that the ERN is
independent of error awareness and may represent preconscious conflict processing. In contrast,
Dhar et al. (2011) and Hewig et al. (2011) observed increased ERN amplitudes for aware relative
to unaware errors, possibly suggesting that ERN amplitudes may index response conflict that is
dependent, at least in part, on conscious awareness.
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Error awareness methods. Recent research demonstrates methodological means for
investigating how ERP components are affected by and indicate conscious error awareness. One
specific task, the error awareness task (EAT), was designed and tested for use as a measure of
conscious error awareness and provides an effective platform for eliciting a significant number
of both conscious and unconscious errors (Ullsperger et al., 2010). The EAT is a modified motor
go/no-go task that involves participants making commission errors of which they are either
aware or unaware. The task requires that participants respond to a series of Stroop-type color
words in incongruent fonts (e.g., the “RED” written in blue ink) with two different types of nogo lures where participants are to withhold their response. The lure types include a word
repeated twice consecutively and a congruent color word trial where the word matches the ink
color (e.g., the word “RED” written in red ink). By having competing types of response
inhibition rules, the aim is to vary the strength of stimulus-response relationships, resulting in
competitive suppression of rule representations such that the more prepotent rule would suppress
the weaker rule (Hester et al., 2005). The suppression of the weaker rule then produces a
significant number of errors, a small proportion of which may go unnoticed due to a primary
focus on the prepotent rule. In the case of the EAT the goal is to use the human overlearned
word reading behavior as a prepotent response and suppress awareness of word color. The rule
competition predisposes the participants to attend to the repeat trials and not the Stroop
congruent color trials. Participants are then trained to press an error awareness button on the trial
following an error to signal conscious awareness.
Hester et al. (2005) initially used the EAT as a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) task seeking to confirm previous findings related to the ERN and Pe components as
distinct aspects of error processing and awareness. They demonstrated ACC activation
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following errors, but that presence of the ACC activation alone was insufficient for conscious
error awareness and that a later activation, hypothesized to be the Pe component, was indicative
of error awareness. They found significant activity in bilateral prefrontal cortices and parietal
regions when participants signaled error awareness leading them to the conclusion that ACC
activation, while necessary for error awareness is insufficient. Hester et al. (2005) provided
support for the ERN’s involvement in conflict detection and the Pe’s involvement in conscious
error-awareness through localization of error-awareness processes. They later used the EAT to
demonstrate that there was impaired error awareness on behavioral measures in clinical
populations of cocaine (Hester, Simões-Franklin, & Garavan, 2007) and chronic cannabis users
(Hester, Nestor, & Garavan, 2009) when compared to controls. O’Connell et al. (2007)
strengthened the methodological rigor of error awareness studies in EEG/ERP research by using
the EAT to increase the number of errors, show reliable ERP components, and improve the
process for subjectively reporting and recording error awareness in a control population (Wessel,
2012). A next step is to apply the EAT task to other clinical populations, such as M/S TBI, to
better understand the role of conscious error awareness demonstrated through
electrophysiological components.
An important question related specifically to the EAT and task performance when using a
M/S TBI group relates to the pattern of performance across the task. Given the high rate of
apathy, attentional dysregulation, and decreased awareness in those with M/S TBI there is reason
to believe that performance may change throughout tasks that are perceived as, or become more
difficult, as a result of decreased engagement or decreased cognitive reserve and attentional
ability. The question of variable performance over task duration comes from a recent hypothesis
proposing a relationship between effort and apathy in those with brain damage (Arnould et al.,
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2013). The hypothesis indicated that effort and apathy are related through the influence of
cognitive deficits such as attentional and executive impairments, and that those with a TBI are
likely to recruit more effort early in a task that is easy in order to compensate for deficits, but
disengage more quickly when the task becomes difficult (Arnould et al., 2013).
Several studies have looked at how the ERN and Pe components of the ERP are affected
by TBI (M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009; M. J. Larson, Kaufman, Schmalfuss, & Perlstein, 2007;
Wessel et al., 2011). The ERN is attenuated in those with M/S TBI, but the Pe and post-error
slowing are generally similar to those of healthy controls (M. J. Larson et al., 2007; M. J. Larson
& Perlstein, 2009). Negative affect, as seen through anxiety and depression levels, inversely
correlates with ERN amplitude and level of cognitive deficits predicts Pe amplitudes in those
with severe TBI (M. J. Larson et al., 2009; 2011). As noted above, depression and co-occurring
apathy are very common in those with a TBI where 46%-71% have apathy (van Reekum et al.,
2005), and 83% have comorbid apathy and depression (Kant et al., 1998).
No previous studies have examined how apathy influences performance monitoring and
conscious error awareness in those with M/S TBI as seen through the use of ERPs as well as
other neuropsychological measures. A greater understanding of the relationship between
negative affect, specifically apathy, and error awareness will guide future research aimed at the
development of more efficient and cost effective rehabilitation and treatment techniques. An
understanding of how apathy relates to a person’s ability to detect deficits in their behaviors,
specifically errors, may provide clinicians with more accurate expectations of what their patients
with M/S TBI are capable of and where to start working with them on developing coping and
compensatory abilities. Thus, the current dissertation had the following specific aims:
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Aim 1: To determine the presence or absence of group differences between those with M/S TBI
and non-TBI controls on behavioral and electrophysiological indices of conscious error
awareness.
•

Hypothesis 1: Individuals with M/S TBI will have fewer aware errors than
demographically-similar controls.

•

Hypothesis 2: There will be group differences between M/S TBI participants and nonTBI controls for Pe amplitudes on aware error trials and ERN amplitudes on unaware
error trials.

Aim 2: To determine the relationship between apathy and behavioral and electrophysiological
indices of error awareness when controlling for injury severity and cognitive functioning in only
those with M/S TBI.
•

Hypothesis 1: Increased levels of apathy will be associated with a higher proportion of
unaware errors relative to aware errors in those with M/S TBI.

•

Hypothesis 2: Increased levels of apathy will be associated with decreased Pe and ERN
amplitudes in those with M/S TBI.
Method

Participants
Participants consisted of two separate groups: individuals with M/S TBI and healthy
controls. Due to the nature of the EEG recording there is a risk for excessive artifact and the
need to exclude participants due to “noisy” data or equipment malfunction. Noise in the EEG
comes from multiple sources including external electrical interference and internal participant
sources such as movement artifacts and blinks (Fabiani et al., 2000). In order to account for
participants that would be excluded due to excessive noise I recruited 75 control participants and
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randomly matched 30 control participants with the M/S TBI group. I then created a second set of
30 control participants from the remaining control participants to use as a secondary control
group to confirm principal behavioral and ERP analyses (a sensitivity analysis).
Inclusion and exclusion criteria. All participants were between the ages of 18 and 56
years old. They were all native-English speakers and all but two of the M/S TBI participants
were right-handed (one of which was not included in the ERP analyses). It was important to use
participants who are right-handed because there are potential hemispheric differences in those
who are left-handed compared with right-handed individuals (Zhavoronkova, 2000). However, I
determined that inclusion of two left-handed individuals was of minor risk due to the small
percentage (approximately 25-30%) of left-handed individuals who demonstrate some level of
hemispheric language and memory differences (Lezak et al., 2012). Only one of the left-handed
individuals was included in ERP analyses. I used native-English speakers due to different
patterns of neural activity found when a person is reading materials that are not in their native
tongue (Sakai, 2005) and all materials used in this study were written and standardized in
English.
Exclusion criteria included: history of learning disability, ADHD, psychotic or bipolar
disorder, severe depression, uncorrected vision, language comprehension deficits, recent
substance dependence or history of neurological impairment other than TBI (i.e., stroke,
epilepsy). Healthy controls were excluded if they had any history of mental health diagnosis in
addition to the previous exclusionary criteria. All participants were screened for and excluded if
they had color blindness using the Ishihara pseudo-isochromatic color plates (Clark, 1924).
Participants included. For the principal analyses, 26 participants with a M/S TBI were
recruited, of which five participants were excluded from ERP analysis due to insufficient
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numbers of either aware or unaware error trials or excessively noisy data, one was excluded
because they were unable to adequately learn the EAT task, and one other due to excessive
visual acuity and comprehension problems when completing the Ishihara Color Blindness Test.
Due to that participant’s inability to complete a basic color blindness test he was excluded.
Fifteen control participants were excluded due to noise and insufficient numbers of trials. Trials
were considered bad and removed if more than 15% of channels were marked bad. Channels
were marked bad if the fast average amplitude exceeded 100!V or if the differential average
amplitude exceeded 50!V. I established that any person with fewer than six errors in any trial
category would be excluded due to a lack of stability and reliability in the average component
waveform with fewer trials in adult participants (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009b). This left a total
sample size of 49 for EEG analysis and evaluation (control n=30, TBI n=19). The sample size
used for behavioral analysis included all participants from the TBI group (n= 24) that completed
the EAT and the 30 randomly selected controls.
There was a significant difference in years of age between the control group and the M/S
TBI groups, with an independent samples t-test showing that the control group was younger,
t(1,52) = -2.98, p = .004 (see Table 1). There was no difference in years of education between
the TBI and control groups, t(1,52) = -1.03, p = .31. A chi-squared test indicated that there was
also a significant difference between the groups on gender distribution, "2(1) = 3.80, p = .05,
with the M/S TBI group having a higher proportion of males to females than the control group.
The M/S TBI group had 16 males and 8 females (66.7% male) and the control group consisted of
12 males and 18 females (40.0% males).
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Table 1
Demographic Data including Means, Standard Deviation (SD), and Range by Group

M/S TBI (n = 24)

Control (n = 30)

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

Age (years)

30.29

11.69

18 – 56

22.87

6.32

18 – 49

Education (years)

14.79

2.45

11 – 22

14.25

1.34

12 – 16

Participants were recruited via flyers placed throughout the Brigham Young University
and Utah Valley University campuses and local community. Specific recruiting for the M/S TBI
group occurred at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, TBI support groups, Intermountain
Medical Center’s neurorehabilitation facility in Murray, UT, the Brigham Young University
Comprehensive Clinic, the Utah Brain Injury Alliance, local medical providers, and through
compiled lists of previous research participants who expressed interest in further participation in
research. Control participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes that offer
extra credit for research participation and flyers posted throughout the local community.
Participants received course credit or $35 for participation.
Assessing injury severity. The M/S TBI group consisted of participants who sustained a
TBI between approximately six months prior to participation and less than ten years from study
participation. Waiting six months following an injury was important due to spontaneous
recovery following TBI where the person will recover some levels of functioning as the brain
undergoes healing (Myburgh et al., 2008; Novack, Alderson, Bush, Meythaler, & Canupp, 2000).
TBI severity was determined using three possible indices obtained from medical records and
structured interviews (see below) with participants. The three indices included duration of loss
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of consciousness (LOC), duration of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA), and Glasgow Comma Scale
(GCS) score (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). Following current classification standards, moderate
TBI was defined as the lowest post-resuscitation GCS score in a range of 9-12, PTA between 1
and 7 days, and LOC of more than 30 minutes, but less than 6 hours (Bigler, 1990; Bond, 1986;
Lezak et al., 2012). Severe TBI was defined as a GCS score of less than 9, LOC of greater than
6 hours, or PTA of more than 7 days (Bigler, 1990; Bond, 1986; Lezak et al., 2012). The main
criterion for determining injury severity was the lowest post-resuscitation GCS, when available
through documentation, with PTA and LOC acting as alternate criteria for assessment of injury
severity when records were unavailable or insufficient to document GCS.
Participants were asked to bring with them or provide copies of medical records and
neuroimaging for review to determine level of severity. If participants did not have access to
their medical records, a signed release was requested in order to obtain copies of the records
from their health care provider(s). In addition, if there were discrepancies between the
participant report and medical records, or medical records were unavailable, comprehensive
interviews were conducted with the participant and/or significant other/caregiver to further
determine level of severity. While determination of LOC and PTA based on retrospective
interview has been criticized due to confusion between disorientation and PTA (Shores,
Marosszeky, Sandanam, & Batchelor, 1986) and the presence of isolated recall of events
detached from continuous memory, termed “islands of memory,” (Gronwall & Wrightson,
1980), I employed retrospective interviewing methods to minimize such confusion.
Retrospective techniques have been shown to be reliable and valid for determining injury
severity based on PTA (King et al., 1997; McMillan, Jongen, & Greenwood, 1996).
Specifically, I asked very specific questions related to what the participants themselves could
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remember and not what others had told them happened (e.g. “What is the last thing you
remember before the accident?). Table 2 contains a summary of the TBI group severity
classification information and whether or not the information was obtained through structured
clinical interview or through medical records.
Briefly, of the 24 M/S TBI participants there were 13 classified as severe and 11 as
moderate. Classifications were determined for nine of the participants from medical records and
the remaining 15 from participant and/or family member accounts gathered through the
previously mentioned structured clinical interview. Three participants refused to sign medical
releases of information. There were GCS scores reported in three (GCS = 3, 7, and 14) of the
nine participants with medical records. The participant with a GCS score of 14 was not seen
until the second day following the injury, after which he/she was hospitalized for 10 days and
remained in PTA for four days, according to medical records. One severe TBI participant had no
documented LOC, a reported Ranchos Los Amigos Cognitive Scale score of three, and a
documented diagnosis of severe TBI. For the remaining participants I based injury severity
classifications on retrospective clinical interview (n = 15) or other medical record information (n
= 6) related to duration of PTA and LOC. Average LOC for the moderate TBI participants was
0.51 (SD = 0.34) hours with PTA being 45.03 (SD = 40.23) hours. The severe TBI participants
had an average LOC duration of 366.93 (SD = 377.06) hours and PTA duration of 994.62 (SD =
1556.17) hours.

31
Table 2
Description of TBI Participant Injury Severity and Verification
LOC
Hours

Age

Sex

Etiology

18

M

Fall

>0.50

27

F

BFT

504

41

F

Bike

22

M

MVA

24

M

MVA

30

M

21

PTA
Hours

Medical
Record

Patient
Account

8

X

504

99

X

24

82

X

336

336

99

X

384

1440

54

X

Fall

1

96

150

X

M

Fall

0.10

72

6

X

26

F

MVA

96

240

72

X

31

M

MVA

1080

336

69

35

M

MVA

0.50

1

16

X

28

F

Fall

0.33

36

98

X

24

M

MVA

144

144

27

X

23

F

MVA

*

40

66

X

19

M

Fall

1

1.50

19

X

23

F

MVA

0.03

2016

31

X

24

M

Bike

>0.05

336

26

56

M

MVA

0.50

72

35

X

45

F

Fall

336

120

X

52

M

Bike

0.92

120

8

26

M

Bike

0.25

32

60

45

M

BFT

672

1344

39

X

51

M

Bike

18

18

105

X

18

M

Fall

120

120

6

X

18

F

MVA

1080

5760

25

X

Mean:

198.98

559.39

54.92

SD:

330.09

1223.84

41.09

.50

336

0.75

Months
Post

X

X

X
X

Note. BFT = blunt force trauma, Bike = cycling accident, MVA = motor vehicle accident

32
Error Awareness Task (EAT)
The computerized EAT was completed during EEG recording. The EAT was originally
developed by Robert Hester, PhD. and was adapted and used in this research with his permission
(Hester et al., 2005; 2009).

Incongruent – Go Trials

Congruent

Repetition

Stroop

No-Go Trial

Figure 2. Graphic representation of the EAT task. The EAT presents a serial stream of single color words in
incongruent fonts, with the word presented for 900 milliseconds followed by a random inter-trial interval between
1000 and 1500 milliseconds. Participants were trained to respond to each of the words with a single ‘Go trial’ button
press, and withhold this response when either of two different circumstances arose. The first was if the same word
was presented on two consecutive trials (Repeat No-go), and the second was if the word and color font of the word
match (Congruent Stroop No-go). To indicate ‘error awareness’ participants were trained to press the error button on
the trial following any commission errors. Adapted from “Neural Mechanisms Involved in Error Processing: A
Comparison of Errors Made With and Without Awareness,” by R. Hester, J. J. Foxe, S. Molholm, M. Shpaner, & H.
Garavana, 2005, NeuroImage, 27, p. 603. Copyright 2005 by Elsevier, Inc.

The EAT consists of a practice condition and the main task. The main task is
summarized in Figure 2. The purpose of the EAT is to create a scenario where the participant is
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faced with a task that is sufficiently difficult to illicit a significant number of errors based on two
different rules they must pay attention to. Of the two rules one is more prepotent than the other
and as such the person will be more inclined to focus on this rule and not be as aware they are
making errors related to the other.
In the EAT practice there are four steps. During the first step, the participants saw the
color words “RED,” “GREEN,” “BLUE,” etc. written in a colored font that does not correspond
with the word presented. For example, the word “RED” written in blue ink or the word
“GREEN” written in red ink. Participants were instructed to press “1” for each stimulus. In the
second step participants were instructed to continue with the previous instructions, but also told
that if a word was repeated twice in a row they were not to press any key when the repeated word
was displayed (the word “Red” followed by “Red”) a second time (consecutively repeated word
equals no-go stimulus). Participants were then instructed that if they made a mistake and pressed
the “1” button when they should have withheld their response on a repeated word they needed to
press “2” on the next trial in order to indicate awareness of the error. In the third step the second
rule was introduced. They were instructed to continue to press “1” for each incongruent stimulus
(color word presented in a different color of font, e.g., “RED” written in blue ink), however, if
the word was written in the same color of font as the written word they do not press any key
(congruent stimulus equals a no-go trial). The last step reminded participants that if they did
press a key on either a congruent trial or a repetition trial they were to signal they made an error
by pressing “2” on the subsequent trial regardless of the type of stimulus shown during the
“awareness” trial. The first phase (steps one and two) of the practice consisted of 50 trials and
the second phase (steps three and four) consisted of 100 trials to ensure adequate learning of each
rule. If a participant did not meet a 75% criterion indicating mastery of each step in the practice

34
they were allowed to repeat that portion of the practice up to two more times in order to meet
rule mastery criteria. Only one of the TBI participants was unable to meet the necessary mastery
level and was excluded from the study. No other participants from either group required more
than one extra practice on either phase to meet the 75% mastery level.
Following the practice trials, participants began the EAT task. The task employed all of
the rules the person was taught during the practice. They were to press “1” if presented with an
incongruent stimulus (color word and font do not match). If they saw a congruent stimulus
(matching color word and font) or they saw a consecutively repeated word, they were not to
press any key. If they did press a key when not indicated they were to signal that they made an
error by pressing “2” on the next trial. Each word was presented for 900 milliseconds with a
random inter-trial interval (ITI) of between 1000 and 1500 milliseconds. The task consisted of
four blocks of 225 trials including 46 no-go trials (23 incongruent and 23 repetitions) and 179 go
trials for a total of 900 trials (717 go and 183 no-go).
Electrophysiological Data Recording, Reduction, and Measurement
Electroencephalogram data was recorded from a geodesic sensor net with 128 scalp sites
and Electrical Geodesics, Inc., (EGI; Eugene, Oregon) amplifier system (20K gain, nominal
bandpass = .10-100Hz). Electrode placements enabled recording vertical and horizontal eye
movements reflecting electro-oculographic (EOG) activity. Data from the EEG was referenced
to the vertex electrode and digitized continuously at 250Hz with a 24-bit analog-to-digital
converter. A right posterior electrode approximately two inches behind the right mastoid served
as common ground. Electrode impedance was maintained at or below 50k!.
Electroencephalographam data was segmented off-line and single trial epochs rejected if
voltages exceeded 100!V, transitional (sample-to-sample) thresholds were greater than 100!V,
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or eye-channel amplitudes were above 70!V. Data was digitally re-referenced to an average
reference then digitally low-pass filtered at 30Hz. Eye movement artifacts including blinks,
saccades, and movements were corrected using independent component analysis as part of the
open source ERP Toolkit in Matlab (Dien, 2010). Independent component analysis (ICA) allows
for automatic artifact correction through identification of prototypical blinks and saccades that
are applied to a template. Waveform data was then analyzed using the template to remove
artifacts.
In order to understand potential differences between early and late performance on the
EAT task I further segmented the ERP data into early and late halves with the intention of
evaluating electrophysiological differences in error awareness due to potential differences in
early and late performance across the task. However, there were insufficient trials in multiple
categories for 13 out of the 19 M/S TBI participants leaving insufficient sample size to complete
a full analysis. Early and late analyses of the ERPs were, therefore, not conducted.
Analysis of the Pe and ERN was achieved through similar processes as used by Larson et
al. (2007) in a study of the Pe and ERN in individuals with M/S TBI and healthy control
participants. Event-related epochs were response-locked and extracted with a duration starting
400 ms prior to stimulus response, and ending 800 ms after response, with -400 milliseconds
(ms) to -200 ms serving as the baseline. Due to the absence of a distinct peak, the Pe was
identified as the averaged activity from 200 ms to 400 ms post-response from six centro-parietal
sites (54, 55, 61, 62, 78, 79, see Figure 3). The ERN was identified as the peak negative
amplitude deflection from 0 ms to 100 ms from five fronto-central sites (Ref [Cz], 7, 106, and 6
[FCz], see Figure 3) averaged across 15 ms pre- to 15 ms post-peak amplitude in order to control
for group-wise latency differences. The use of an adaptive mean procedure improves robustness

36
to noise in both ERN and Pe analyses when compared to peak amplitudes (Clayson, Baldwin, &
Larson, 2013). Correct-response data for both components was collected using the same time
window and electrodes to include in data analysis for use as an error-trial comparison (Clayson
et al., 2013).

Blue Circle = ERN Location
Red Circle = Pe Location

Figure 3. ERP component electrode locations.

Neuropsychological Functioning, Mood, and Apathy Measures
Participants completed a short battery of measures aimed to characterize their current
neuropsychological functioning, current mood, and levels of apathy. Measures were
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administered through the use of both paper-and-pencil tasks as well as electronically through use
of an online survey tool (http://www.byu.qualtrics.com).
Apathy Evaluation Scale – Self-Rating Form (AES). The AES is an 18-item self-report
apathy measure that demonstrates good reliability (internal consistency = 0.86-0.94) and validity
(Glenn et al., 2002; Marin, 1991). Scores on the AES range from 18-72 with a mean of 28 and
standard deviation of +/-6 on the original validation sample (Marin, 1991). The AES has been
used with TBI populations and found to be a sensitive measure at determining presence of apathy
(Clarke et al., 2011) and differentiating apathy from anxiety and depression (Kant et al., 1998).
(Lane-Brown & Tate, 2009b) recently validated the AES in a M/S TBI population and
established a score of 37 as a reliable cutoff for presence of apathy in this population.
Beck Depression Inventory – Second edition (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a depression
measure used to screen for and identify levels of depression in clinical and normal populations.
It has a internal consistency reliability of a=0.92 (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996). The BDIII provides a depression rating score and cutoff scores have been defined for use with M/S TBI
populations (Homaifar, Brenner, & Gutierrez, 2009) with a score of 35 being needed to meet
criteria for clinical depression in a M/S TBI population.
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR). The WTAR is a 50-item measure of
premorbid intellectual functioning. This measure was demonstrated as valid in estimating preinjury intelligence in a severe TBI population (Green, Melo, Christensen, Ngo, Monette, &
Bradbury, 2008). This measure was used to describe the nature of our M/S TBI group.
Frontal Systems Behavior Scale – Self-Rating Form (FrSBe). The FrSBe is a 46-item behavior
rating scale originally designed to measure behavioral change associated with frontal lobe injury.
Psychometrically the FrSBE has demonstrated good reliability (internal consistency 0.96; split
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half 0.93) and validity (Clarke et al., 2011; Zgaljardic, Borod, Foldi, & Mattis, 2003). The
FrSBe gathers information regarding behavioral changes related to functioning in natural settings
from the patient (self-report) and significant others. Also included are self- and other ratings of
premorbid behavior to use as comparison data. The FrSBE includes an overall composite score
and three subscales that include questions assessing apathy, disinhibition, and executive function.
Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS). The
RBANS, although initially designed as a screening tool for the assessment of dementia, has
gained considerable use as a neuropsychological screening instrument for neurologic and
psychiatric disorders based on its short administration time, co-normed index scores, inclusion of
a summary score, and equivalent A and B forms for use across multiple test administrations
(Randolph, Tierney, Mohr, & Chase, 1998). The RBANS consists of twelve subtests measuring
five primary domains: immediate memory, delayed memory, visuospatial/constructional
abilities, language, and attention/processing speed (Randolph et al., 1998). Index scores are
provided for each domain along with a Total scale score. Studies demonstrate the reliability and
validity of the RBANS in detecting cognitive impairment in individuals with TBI (McKay,
Casey, Wertheimer, & Fichtenberg, 2007; McKay, Wertheimer, Fichtenberg, & Casey, 2008).
The Total scale score was used to assess general cognitive functioning and the five domain
indices to further delineate group neuropsychological status.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using the statistical software package SPSS 21 (SPSS
IBM, New York, NY) and the ERP PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010). I initially ensured normality of
data distribution and variance for all observed variables through the visual observation of
scatterplots and box plots to ensure normality and Levene’s test to ensure equality of variances
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(Levene, 1960). Further data cleaning was done through identification of potential outliers
observed on scatterplots and box plots that had scores beyond two interquartile ranges from the
median, as the median is unaffected by outliers. Using this method no outliers were identified.
Means, standard deviations, and ranges were calculated for ERP component amplitude,
behavioral data (RT, accuracy, and error awareness), number of trials as a function of trial type
(go, correct, error, awareness level, and lure type), neuropsychological measures (total and
subscales where available), self-report mood and apathy data, and demographic variables. Zeroorder correlations and independent-samples t-tests were used to evaluate the relationship
between and compare groups on ERP component amplitudes, behavioral, trial,
neuropsychological, and self-report data. Significance for all analyses was set at the p = .05
level.
I subsequently examined demographic variables as a function of group to ensure groups
were similar on age, education, number of trials for ERP analysis, and gender ratio using
independent-samples t-tests and chi-square analysis, respectively. All accuracy and error
awareness percentages were transformed using an arcsine transformation. I used the arcsine
transformation because accuracy and error awareness percentages were derived from count data
resulting in increased risk for binomial distributions and a significant negative skew. Due to
significant skew the accuracy and error awareness percentages required the arcsine
transformation to normalize the distribution. Additionally, in order to account for differences
between moderate and severe TBI groups I repeated all non-significant M/S TBI group analyses
with only the severe TBI group (n = 13 for behavioral and mood analyses and n = 10 for ERP
component analyses).
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To address Aim 1, Hypothesis 1 (the M/S TBI group will have fewer aware errors
compared to controls) robust ANOVAs were calculated using the ERP PCA Toolkit to evaluate
arcsine-transformed error awareness rates between M/S TBI and control groups. Robust
ANOVAs were used in order to overcome the biasing effects of nonnormality, (co)variance
heterogeneity between groups, non-orthogonal groups, and to reduce Type I error (Dien, 2010;
Keselman, Wilcox, & Lix, 2003). Robust ANOVA statistics are interpreted similarly to
traditional ANOVAs, but avoid susceptibility to assumption violations in the same way as
traditional ANOVAs. I decomposed significant interactions using Fisher’s least significant
difference approach, controlling for family-wise Type I error. The seed for the number
generation was set at 1,000, and the number of iterations used for bootstrapping was 50,000 for
all robust ANOVA analyses (Clayson & Larson, 2012; Dien, Franklin, & May, 2006; Dien,
Michelson, & Franklin, 2010; M. J. Larson, Clawson, Clayson, & South, 2012a). I expected that
the TBI group would have a significantly lower proportion of aware errors than controls. I also
completed additional robust ANOVAs for arcsine transformed no-go accuracy, arcsine
transformed accuracy rates for color and repeat trials, and response times for go, error, aware
errors, unaware errors, and awareness response trials between groups. I then used a 2-Group
(M/S TBI, control) x 2-Trial Type (go, error) robust ANOVA to detect differences in RTs.
To address potential differences in task performance over time related to impairments in
attention or fatigue, I split the participant task into an early half from trials 1-450 and a late half
from trials 451-900. I also completed separate 2-Group x 2-Time (early, late) robust ANOVAs
to compare groups on first and second half behavioral performance for each RT and accuracy
condition.
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For Aim 1, Hypothesis 2, (there will be group differences in the Pe and ERN amplitudes
on error-aware trials and error-unaware trials, respectively) I conducted 2-Group (M/S TBI,
control) x 2-Error Type (aware, unaware) robust ANOVAs on Pe and ERN amplitudes using the
ERP PCA Toolkit (Dien, 2010). I expected that the M/S TBI group would have significantly
lower Pe amplitudes on aware error trials and lower ERN amplitudes on unaware error trials
relative to the control group. I did not complete robust ANOVAs comparing early to late
performance for ERN and Pe component amplitudes due to too few error trials across
participants for adequate sample size (see Electrophysiological Data Recording, Reduction, and
Measurement section above). Groups were then compared by gender for ERN and Pe
amplitudes using a 2-Group x 2-Gender x 2-Error Type robust ANOVA.
To address Aim 2, I used a previously completed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a
shortened version of the AES and BDI-II that showed distinct apathy and depression factors with
the purpose of determining appropriate items that loaded onto an apathy composite for inclusion
in multiple regression analyses (Kirsch-Darrow, Marsiske, Okun, Bauer, & Bowers, 2011). It is
generally recommended that there should be ten times the number of subjects in a factor analysis
as the number of variables with a minimum of 100 subjects (Warner, 2008). As the current
sample size is below this recommendation and insufficient for a reliable factor analysis I used the
Kirsch-Darrow et al. (2011) factor analysis due to their sample size of 146 Parkinson’s disease
patients. While their CFA was not with a M/S TBI population, apathy has been shown to be a
consistent construct and differentiated from depression across multiple neurological disorders
(Kirsch-Darrow et al., 2006; Landes et al., 2005; Naarding et al., 2009). The Kirsch-Darrow et
al. (2011) CFA found a four-factor model of the AES and BDI-II with the following factors: (1)
apathy, (2) dysphoric mood, (3) loss of interest/pleasure, and (4) somatic concerns. The apathy
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factor consisted of nine items from the AES (4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13). Factor loadings
for item parcels were between .646 and .870. The other three factors included the BDI-II items
and the remaining AES items. The overall fit of the 4-factor model was considered good (see
Kirsch-Darrow et al., 2011). I attempted to replicate the Kirsch-Darrow et al. (2011) factor
analysis, but was unable to support an adequately fitting model, most likely due to a significantly
smaller sample size in the current study. As such, I used the factor structure from the above
model and included results from the specific questions listed above in an apathy variable for the
Aim 2 regression analyses.
I determined that the regression analyses would be completed with only the M/S TBI
group, as the control group did not have an injury to which the injury severity measures can be
applied. Furthermore, the intent of Aim 1 was to demonstrate that there was a difference
between the M/S TBI group and the non-TBI group relative to accuracy of error awareness
leading to distinct analysis of the correlation of apathy and accuracy in the M/S TBI group.
I next conducted three separate multiple regression analyses for the M/S TBI group with
the newly derived apathy variable, duration of LOC and PTA, and RBANS Total score as
independent (i.e., predictor) variables. For Hypothesis 1 (increased levels of apathy will be
associated with a higher proportion of unaware errors relative to aware errors in those with M/S
TBI), I used multiple regression to predict the arcsine transformed unaware errors percentage in
the M/S TBI group, when controlling for apathy, duration of LOC and PTA, and RBANS scores.
For Hypothesis 2 (increased apathy will be related to decreased Pe and ERN amplitudes), I
predicted both Pe error amplitude and ERN amplitude in separate analyses from level of apathy
while controlling for injury severity (LOC and PTA duration), and RBANS scores. I used the
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variance inflation factor (VIF) to test for multicollinearity (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, &
Nizam, 2007).
In order to account for differences between controls that were randomly selected and the
remaining controls from the original sample, the remaining control participants were combined
(n = 30 for all analyses except ERP analyses where n = 16) and used in a separate set of
replication analyses to determine any potential differences due specifically to the subset of
controls included in the principal analyses. Any discrepancies between the original control
group and the replication control group were subjected to a combined control group analysis to
determine results.
Results
Mood and Apathy Analyses
Data for measures of mood and apathy as a function of group are presented in Tables 3
and 4. There were significant between-group differences on levels of depression and apathy
reported in the Beck Depression Inventory–II, t(1,30.14) = -4.27, p < .001, the Apathy
Evaluation Scale, t(1,33.98) = -3.46, p = .001, and the composed apathy score, t(1,49) = -2.21, p
= .03, with the M/S TBI group reporting higher levels of both broad depression and specific
apathy compared to non-injured controls on all measures. Notably, neither group’s mean
depression scores met the threshold for the mild depression lower-bound score of 14 on the BDIII. Similarly, neither group met criteria for elevated levels of apathy using the cut-score for
elevated levels of apathy above 34 on the AES (Andersson, Krogstad, & Finset, 1999b).
The before and after injury scores on the FrSBe subscales of Apathy, Disinhibition, and
Executive Functioning and Total score for only the M/S TBI participants indicated significantly
decreased post-injury functioning for all scales (see Table 4 for descriptive data and significant
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pre-to-post score differences). That is, participants reported worse overall functioning and
higher levels of apathy, disinhibition, and executive functioning after injury. The FrSBe was
only administered to the M/S TBI group because it is specific to people who have suffered an
injury and gives pre- and post-injury scores.

Table 3
Descriptive Data for Mood and Apathy Measures by Group
M/S TBI (n = 24)

Control (n = 30)

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

Significance

BDI - II

11.75

7.84

0 – 28

4.40

3.46

0 – 14

*

AES

30.33

7.16

20 – 50

24.70

3.95

18 – 33

*

Apathy composite

15.54

4.23

10 – 27

13.30

2.98

9 – 20

*

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II, AES = Apathy Evaluation Scale – Self-report, Apathy composite is
the composite apathy scale formed from the significant apathy factor composed of questions from the BDI-II and
AES. Scores on the AES range from 18-72. * = p < .05, ** = p <.01.

Neuropsychological Performance
Analysis of neuropsychological data indicated that there were no significant differences
between the M/S TBI and control groups on the RBANS Total score, t(1,52) = 1.27, p = .21, nor
on the WTAR, t(1,52) = .38, p = .71, indicating no between-group differences on predicted preinjury cognitive functioning or measured post-injury overall cognitive scores. No group
differences for the RBANS domains of immediate and delayed memory, attention, and
visuospatial processing (ts < 1.33, ps > .19; see Table 5) were found when comparing M/S TBI
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participants to healthy controls. There was a significant difference between the M/S TBI and
control groups on the Language subscale, t(1,52) = 2.02, p = .05, with the M/S TBI group
performing below controls indicating decreased performance on verbal fluency and naming tasks
in those with a M/S TBI.

Table 4
Descriptive Data from the Frontal Systems Behavioral Scale (FrSBe)

Before Injury
Mean

SD

Range

After Injury
Mean

SD

Range

Significance

FrSBe Total

91.57

12.46

65 – 120

106.75

18.02

64 – 142

*

Apathy

25.54

4.91

17 – 37

31.17

8.03

17 – 45

*

Disinhibition

33.21

4.48

27 – 46

36.50

5.05

28 – 48

*

Executive Function

33.00

6.35

19 – 48

39.08

8.64

19 – 60

*

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p <.01.

Behavioral Analyses for the EAT
Accuracy and error awareness. Accuracy and response time data for the M/S TBI
participants and controls are included in Table 6 below. For tests of Aim 1, Hypothesis 1, there
were no significant differences between M/S TBI and control participants on percentage of
aware errors, TWJt/c(1.0,28.6) = 2.20, p = .15. Similarly, there were no significant between-group
differences for other measures of EAT accuracy including, no-go accuracy, TWJt/c(1.0,41.0) =
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0.01, p = .93, and no-go accuracy broken down by lure type (i.e., repeat and color) TWJt/cs <
0.06, and ps > .81. Error awareness and error awareness separated by lure type (i.e., repeat and
color) showed no significant group differences between M/S TBI and control participants
(TWJt/cs < 2.63, ps > .12).

Table 5
Descriptive Data of Neuropsychological Measures by Group

M/S TBI (n = 24)

Control (n = 30)

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

109.29

9.53

82 – 121

110.50

7.38

89 - 120

95.83

22.32

54 – 145

102.10

13.84

77 – 127

98.00

19.31

57 – 136

100.53

14.85

78 – 130

104.29

13.60

75 – 126

107.47

16.17

62 – 126

Language

93.50

19.62

51 – 130

102.53

13.08

78 – 124

Attention

96.29

20.52

55 – 128

99.13

13.43

64 – 120

Delayed Memory

92.63

21.34

48 – 131

98.33

8.95

83 - 112

WTAR (WAIS-III
Predicted)
RBANS Total
Immediate Memory
Visuospatial

Note. RBANS = Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status, WTAR = Predicted Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale -III Full Scale Intelligence Quotient score of the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading.

Response times (RTs). There were no significant differences when comparing the M/S
TBI and controls groups on RTs for overall performance on the EAT, TWJt/cs < 45.9, and ps >
.08. A separate 2-Trial Type (Go, Error) by 2-Group robust ANOVA for RTs indicated a
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significant main effect of accuracy, TWJt/c(1,43.9) = 15.30, p < .001, with slower error- than gotrial RTs. There was no significant Trial Type x Group interaction, TWJt/c(1,43.9) = 2.02, p =
.16, or main effect of group, TWJt/c(1,44.2) = 1.73, p = .19 (see Table 6).

Table 6
Behavioral Data for M/S TBI and Control Groups on the Whole Error Awareness Task
M/S TBI (n = 24)

Control (n =30)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

No-Go Accuracy (% correct)

.49

.23

.49

.19

Repeat No-Go accuracy

.57

.23

.56

.20

Color No-Go accuracy

.40

.25

.42

.22

.65

.24

.74

.12

Repeat error awareness

.59

.27

.70

.17

Color error awareness

.70

.25

.82

.28

.35

.24

.25

.11

Go RT (ms)

533.17

91.16

491.74

77.34

Error RT (ms)

543.88

96.52

519.25

99.10

Aware error RT

550.07

104.51

510.96

96.94

Unaware error RT

537.04

101.44

527.53

107.17

438.70

92.79

395.38

69.98

Error Awareness (% of Aware errors)

Unaware Error Proportion

Error Awareness RT (ms)

Note. Accuracy (percentage of correct responses) data presented in Table 6 are not arcsine transformed and represent
the observed overall accuracy rate and percentages of errors a participant was aware of.

48
Early-to-Late Behavioral Performance
Table 7 contains data comparing EAT first half accuracy and RT performance with
second half accuracy and RT performance as a function of group. Figures 4 and 5 contain line
graphs showing significant Group x Time interactions for accuracy and error awareness by error
trial type. Overall, patterns of performance over time differed between the M/S TBI group and
controls with the M/S TBI showing decreasing accuracy and improving awareness over the
course of the task. Controls improved accuracy and awareness. Different patterns between color
and repeat no-go trials are reported below.
Color no-go error awareness. Robust 2-Group x 2-Time (e.g., early, late) ANOVA
comparisons of accuracy for early and late EAT performance showed a significant main effect of
time for awareness of color no-go errors, TWJt/c(1,33.6) = 108.70, p < .001, indicating that both
the M/S TBI and control groups improved their awareness of color no-go errors. There was no
main effect of group, TWJt/c(1,36.4) = 0.49, p = .49, or Group x Time interaction, TWJt/c(1,33.6) =
3.92, p = .06, for color no-go awareness. Both groups improved awareness of color no-go errors
over the course of the EAT.
Color no-go accuracy. When comparing the M/S TBI and control groups on early and
late color no-go accuracy percentage there was no significant main effect of time, TWJt/c(1,44.2)
= 0.87, p = .36. However, there was a significant main effect of group, TWJt/c(1,26.5) = 14.07, p
< .001, and a significant Group x Time interaction, TWJt/c(1,44.2) = 24.24, p < .001.
Decomposition of the interaction shows that M/S TBI performance on color no-go trials
decreased from early to late, TWJt/c(1,21.0) = 29.28, p < .001, while controls performance
increased, TWJt/c(1,27.0) = 5.63, p = .03. Interestingly, the M/S TBI group had a significantly
elevated first-half accuracy percentage, TWJt/c(1,35.0) = 36.68, p < .001, compared to controls,

49
but no difference during the later half of the task on color no-go trials, TWJt/c(1,44.1) = 0.00, p =
.94.
Repeat no-go awareness. Comparisons of repeat no-go awareness for early and late
EAT performance indicated a main effect of time for awareness of repeat no-go errors,
TWJt/c(1,37.4) = 5.19, p = .03, suggesting that both the M/S TBI and control groups improved
their awareness of repeat no-go errors over time. There was no main effect of group,
TWJt/c(1,31.6) = 1.19, p = .29, but there was a Group x Time interaction, TWJt/c(1,37.4) = 5.20, p
= .03 for repeat no-go awareness. Decomposition of the interaction showed that M/S TBI
awareness of repeat errors remained similar from early to late, TWJt/c(1,21.0) = 0.00, p = 1.00,
whereas controls awareness increased during the second half of the task, TWJt/c(1,27.0) = 17.38,
p < .001.
Repeat no-go accuracy. There was a significant main effect of time, TWJt/c(1,45.1) =
7.36, p = .01, a significant main effect of group, TWJt/c(1,30.1) = 8.63, p = .01, and a significant
Group x Time interaction, TWJt/c(1,45.1) = 17.86, p < .001. Decomposition of the interaction
shows an initially worse repeat trial accuracy during the early half of the task for controls,
TWJt/c(1,33.8) = 23.88, p < .001, followed by an improvement in repeat no-go accuracy by
controls during the later half, TWJt/c(1,27.0) = 27.60, p < .001, that accounts for the interaction.
The M/S TBI group showed no difference between repeat no-go accuracy early and late
performance when compared to controls, (ps >.33).
Comparisons of early and late performance for RTs indicated a significant main effect of
time for go trials, TWJt/c(1,46.6) = 17.50, p < .001, error trials, TWJt/c(1,45.0) = 13.96, p < .001,
awareness response trials, TWJt/c(1,46.4) = 23.23, p < .001, and aware and unaware errors,
TWJt/c(1,38.6) = 14.62, p < .001 and TWJt/c(1,43.5) = 5.62, p = .02, respectively with both groups
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showing a decrease in RTs over time. There were no significant main effects of group or Group
x Time interactions for RTs (TWJt/cs < 0.82, ps > .37).
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Figure 4. Line graphs showing means and standard error for arcsine-transformed repeat and color no-go accuracy
split by early and late sections of the EAT. Error bars represent the standard error.
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Figure 5. Line graph showing means and standard error for arcsine-transformed repeat and color error awareness
split by early and late sections of the EAT. Error bars represent the standard error.
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Table 7
Descriptive Data and Early to Late Behavioral Performance Change During the EAT as a Function of Group
M/S TBI (n = 24)
Early

Control (n =30)
Late

Early

Late

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p

.48

.20

.50

.26

.40

.48

.18

.51

.21

.22

.62

.26

.56

.27

.30

.29

.14

.57

.21

<.001

.69

.28

.43

.29

<.001

.26

.20

.44

.25

.04

.66

.25

.64

.26

.67

.72

.12

.78

.13

.01

.58

.23

.57

.29

.97

.55

.20

.74

.17

<.001

.39

.22

.69

.28

<.001

.33

.20

.82

.15

<.001

Go RT (ms)

545.07

87.18

521.52

101.12

.03

531.23

84.82

493.27

93.92

<.001

Error RT (ms)

558.64

96.17

524.89

116.29

.03

535.19

96.24

504.69

103.25

.01

565.92

105.49

527.84

118.50

.05

534.82

95.03

493.73

107.33

.001

550.52

103.09

514.93

110.19

.09

534.54

105.43

518.08

110.56

.12

453.60

91.65

424.45

100.37

.01

426.36

72.19

385.38

81.34

<.001

No-Go Accuracy (% correct)
Repeat No-Go accuracy
Color No-Go accuracy
Error Awareness (% Aware errors)
Repeat error awareness
Color error awareness

Aware error RT
Unaware error RT
Error Awareness RT (ms)

Note. Accuracy (percentage of correct responses) data presented in Table 7 are not arcsine transformed and represent the observed overall accuracy rate and
percentages of errors a participant was aware of. P-values represent paired-samples t-tests comparing early and late arcsine transformed accuracy and error rates,
as well as RTs within groups.
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ERP Component Analyses
Waveforms, scalp maps, and descriptive data for the Pe and ERN are presented in Tables
8-9 and Figures 6-8. Groups did not significantly differ on numbers of trials used for ERP
analyses for any condition (see Table 8). For amplitude of the Pe, there was a significant main
effect of awareness, TWJt/c (1,32.9) = 33.94, p < .001, showing that the awareness of errors
corresponded with increased Pe amplitude for both groups. There was no significant main effect
of group, TWJt/c (1,43.0) = 0.03, p = .86, or Group x Awareness interaction, TWJt/c (1,32.9) =
0.41, p = .52, when comparing M/S TBI with controls on Pe amplitudes.
For the amplitude of the ERN, there was no significant main effect of awareness, TWJt/c
(1,31.7) = 0.03, p = .87, or Group x Awareness interaction, TWJt/c (1,31.7) = 3.05, p = .10, when
comparing M/S TBI and control groups. There was a significant main effect of group for the
ERN with the M/S TBI group having more negative ERN amplitude than controls, TWJt/c
(1,40.3) = 4.37, p = .04 (see Table 9 and Figures 6 and 8).

Table 8
Descriptive Data for Number of Trials by Condition as a Function of Group
M/S TBI

Control

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

Aware

45.42

21.09

8 - 77

52.60

23.44

17 - 106

Unaware

32.42

25.37

7 - 94

19.87

13.16

6 – 54

Correct

413.52

85.26

264 - 512

427.67

71.08

240 - 516

Significance

Note. Included in Table 8 are mean numbers of trials by condition included in ERP component analyses for the
ERN and Pe components. No significant differences between M/S TBI and control groups on number of trials was
found.
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Table 9
Error Trial ERP Means and Standard Deviation (SD) of Pe and ERN Amplitudes by Group

TBI (n = 19)
Unaware

Pe
Pe (severe
only, n = 10)
ERN
ERN (severe
only, n =10)

Control (n = 30)
Aware

Unaware

Aware

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

Mean

SD

Range

0.08

1.30

-2.02-3.67

1.92

2.20

-2.04-5.68

-0.04

1.61

-2.81-3.55

2.21

2.12

-2.05-6.16

0.54

1.33

-0.81-3.67

1.45

1.81

-1.25-4.00

-0.17

1.64

-2.66-3.51

-0.59

1.64

-2.04-5.68

0.26

1.57

-2.61-5.21

0.73

1.69

-1.98-4.05

-0.46

1.31

-2.66-1.90

-0.66

1.83

-4.61-2.14

Note. Pe = Post-error positivity, ERN = Error related negativity.
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Figure 6. Grand average waveforms for the ERN and Pe components by group. Waveform figures were smoothed
using 3-median smoothing techniques alternated with a 3-median skip. Original segmented epochs are responselocked at -400-800ms. The waveforms shown are epoch windows from -200-600ms.
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Pe
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TBI

Correct

Unaware

Aware

Figure 7. Topographical representation of Pe component mean voltages in microvolts (!V) from 200-400 ms post
response for correct, unaware, and aware trials by group. Scalp maps created with ERP LAB (Lopez-Calderon &
Luck, 2014).
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Contro

TBI

Correct

Unaware

Aware

Figure 8. Topographical representation of ERN component mean in microvolts (!V) voltages from 0-100ms post
response for correct, unaware, and aware trials by group. Scalp maps created with ERP LAB (Lopez-Calderon &
Luck, 2014).

Severe TBI Analyses
Neuropsychological analyses. Further analysis comparing only the participants who
experienced a severe TBI (excluding those with moderate TBI) to control participants indicated
significant differences between the severe TBI and control groups on the RBANS Total scale,
t(1,41) = 2.21, p = .03 (M = 88.85, SD = 25.53), Language subscale, t(1,41) = 2.90, p = .01 (M =
88.23, SD = 18.43), and Attention subscale, t(1,41) = 2.75, p = .01 (M = 81.23, SD = 29.62)
showing that controls performed significantly better than severe TBI participants on overall
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cognitive, language, and attention tasks. There were no group differences between severe TBI
and control groups on Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) Full Scale Intelligence
Quotient (FSIQ)-predicted WTAR scores, t(1,52) = 0.53, p = .60, indicating no predicted preinjury differences in intelligence.
Behavioral analyses of the EAT. There were nonsignificant group differences between
severe TBI participants and controls for no-go accuracy, TWJt/c(1.0,19.9) = 0.53, p = .48, and for
error awareness, TWJt/c(1.0,25.5) = 3.72, p = .07, when comparing groups on whole task
performance. Similarly, with only the severe TBI participants there were no group differences
for RTs (TWJt/cs < 2.31, ps > .16) when compared to controls. Results of a 2-Trial Type (Go,
Error) by 2-Group robust ANOVA for RTs using only the severe TBI group indicated a
significant main effect of trial type, TWJt/c(1,18.8) = 7.00, p = .03, again with error trials having
slower RTs than go trials for both groups. There was no significant main effects of group,
TWJt/c(1,22.0) = 0.44, p = .51, or Group x Trial Type interactions, TWJt/c(1,18.8) = 1.46, p = .24.
In sum, the severe TBI group, when compared to controls, performed similarly to the M/S TBI
group.
Early-to-late behavioral performance. When comparing early-to-late EAT
performance for only the severe TBI group fewer differences were found for RTs, accuracy, and
error awareness performance (see Table 10). Between-groups comparisons with controls and
severe TBI groups showed no significant interactions (TWJt/cs < 3.72, ps > .07). The lack of
significant findings could be due to the limited sample size of severe TBI participants.
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Table 10
Descriptive Data of Early to Late Behavioral Performance Change for the Severe TBI Group

Early

Late

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p -value

.43

.20

.44

.27

.85

Repeat No-Go accuracy

.57

.31

.52

.30

.61

Color No-Go accuracy

.65

.29

.35

.27

.001

.61

.29

.63

.28

.56

Repeat error awareness

.53

.25

.51

.34

.88

Color error awareness

.33

.22

.70

.27

.01

Go RT (ms)

531.54

93.23

509.97

106.80

.20

Error RT (ms)

541.25

97.55

513.18

126.95

.25

Aware error RT

561.52

115.88

518.63

132.46

.27

Unaware error RT

516.99

95.54

493.16

95.90

.36

Error Awareness RT (ms)

446.86

109.42

413.79

113.50

.04

No-Go Accuracy (% correct)

Error Awareness (% of Aware errors)

Note. Accuracy (percentage of correct responses) data presented in Table 10 are not arcsine transformed and
represent the observed overall accuracy rate and percentages of errors a participant was aware of. P-values
represent paired-samples t-tests comparing early and late arcsine transformed accuracy and error rates, as well as
RTs within groups.

ERP component analyses. Descriptive data for ERN and Pe amplitudes for the severe
TBI group were included in Table 9 above. There was a significant main effect of awareness,
TWJt/c (1,16.0) = 17.90, p = .001, but nonsignificant main effect of group, TWJt/c (1,21.1) = 0.02,
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p = .88, and Group x Awareness interaction, TWJt/c (1,16.0) = 3.35, p = .09, for Pe amplitudes
when comparing severe TBI participants with controls.
For ERN amplitudes, comparing only severe TBI participants to controls there was no
significant main effect of awareness, TWJt/c (1,14.0) = 0.25, p = .63, or Group x Awareness
interaction, TWJt/c (1,14.0) = 1.30, p = .28. There was also a nonsignificant main effect of group
for ERN amplitudes, TWJt/c (1,16.5) = 4.14, p = .06, indicating that the severe TBI group had
similar amplitude ERN components when compared to controls.
ERP Analyses by Gender
Table 11 contains results of gender comparisons for electrophysiological indices of error
awareness by group. Analyses indicated no significant gender differences for either ERP
component, TWJt/cs < 0.42, ps > .52, and no significant Group x Gender interactions, TWJt/cs <
0.40, ps > .50. There are no detected gender differences for ERP waveforms.
Replication Analyses
I used the second control group, as previously described, to conduct a sensitivity analysis
by replicating primary analyses from the main study to provide confirmation of results. Results
of replication analyses using an alternate control group compared to the M/S TBI group indicated
similar outcomes on demographics, measures of mood and apathy, and neuropsychological tests.
Behavioral results including RTs and accuracy showed similar findings when using both control
groups. Results from robust ANOVAS of early to late performance comparisons for accuracy
and RTs for the alternate control group mirrored the previously reported results. However, there
was one point of discrepancy between the two sets of results related to repeat-trial error
awareness.
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Table 11
Error Trial ERP Means and Standard Deviation (SD) of Pe and ERN Amplitudes by Group and Gender
TBI (n = 19)
Male (n = 12)
Unaware

Female (n = 7)
Aware

Unaware

Aware

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Pe

-0.18

1.06

2.13

2.39

0.53

1.63

1.55

1.93

ERN

0.05

1.78

-0.84

2.01

-0.53

1.40

-0.17

0.55

Control (n = 30)
Male (n = 12)
Unaware

Female (n = 18)
Aware

Unaware

Aware

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Pe

0.48

1.45

1.35

2.12

-0.39

1.65

2.77

1.98

ERN

0.41

1.89

0.46

1.69

0.16

1.36

0.90

1.71

Similar to the original control group, when comparing the alternate control group to M/S
TBI there was a main effect of time, TWJt/c(1,47.8) = 9.23, p < .001, indicating that both groups
improved their awareness of repeat errors. There continued to be no main effect of group,
TWJt/c(1,40.9) = 0.00, p = .99, as well. The difference was in that there was not a Group x Time
interaction, TWJt/c(1,47.8) = 0.20, p = .66 for repeat no-go awareness, as was previously seen.
Results from a combined control group analysis of repeat error awareness indicated a trend-level
main effect of time, TWJt/c(1,31.6) = 3.68, p = .06, and a trend-level Time x Group interaction,
TWJt/c(1,31.6) = 3.64, p = .07, with controls showing improvements in repeat-trial awareness
from early-to-late in the task while the M/S TBI group maintained a similar performance. There
was no significant main effect of group, TWJt/c(1,28.0) = 0.88, p = .35. Analysis of ERP results
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indicated accurate replication of findings from the original control group. Given these findings,
it appears that there is fairly consistent replication of findings between the two control groups
with the exception of the repeat-trial error awareness. Results related to repeat error awareness
were interpreted cautiously given the inconsistency in findings.
The Role of Apathy in Error Awareness
Results of the correlation and regression analyses for Aim 2 were completed with only
the M/S TBI sample because of the need to control for injury severity in the analyses and the
lack of range in the control participant data. Zero-order correlations between arcsine
transformed unaware accuracy and apathy, mood, and neuropsychological variables are shown in
Table 12. As expected, the AES, BDI-II, and FrSBe post-injury Total and Apathy scales were all
highly correlated with each other, but were not significantly correlated with error awareness.
The RBANS total score was significantly correlated with percentage of unaware errors.
Table 13 shows regression coefficients and individual predictor values while Figure 9
contains a scatter plot of apathy scores and unaware error arcsine-transformed unaware error
percentages for the M/S TBI group. Analysis of Aim 2, Hypothesis 1 revealed a significant
model, F(4,19) = 4.65, p = .01 R2 = 49.5%. Apathy was a significant negative predictor of the
proportion of arcsine-transformed unaware errors when controlling for injury severity (LOC and
PTA durations) and neuropsychological functioning (RBANS). Duration of PTA also accounted
for a significant proportion of the variance in the model. Contrary to predictions, the model
indicated that as apathy increased the proportion of unaware errors actually decreased.
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Table 12
Zero-order Correlations Between Unaware Accuracy, Apathy, Mood, and Neuropsychological Variables for the M/S TBI Group
1

2

3

4

5

1. AES

1

2. BDI-II

0.69**

1

3. FrSBe Total

0.48*

0.74**

1

4. Apathy

0.62**

0.63**

0.86**

1

5. Disinhibition

0.05

0.39

0.58**

0.18

1

0.40

0.73**

0.95**

0.77**

0.45*

6. Executive
Function

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1

7. RBANS Total

-0.01

-0.08

-0.15

-0.08

-0.24

-0.09

1

8. AQ Total

-0.13

-0.74**

-0.50*

-0.27

-0.26

-0.64**

0.02

1

9. Unaware Error Rate

-0.01

0.10

0.15

0.08

0.06

0.21

-0.34*

-0.22

1

10. ERN

-0.10

-0.28*

-0.15

-0.06

-0.38

-0.00

0.36*

-0.13

-0.24

1

0.11

0.13

0.13

-0.17

0.26

0.02

-0.40

-0.02

0.22

1

-0.05

-0.01

0.11

-0.35

0.13

0.26

0.0.10

-0.03

0.18

0.28

1

0.87**

0.82**

0.88**

0.75**

-0.05

-0.46*

-0.08

-0.40

0.08

-0.24

11. Pe Unaware
12. Pe Aware
13. Apathy composite

0.31*
-0.03
0.82**

0.25

13

1
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Note. AES = Apathy Evaluation Scale - Self-report, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory; FrSBe = Frontal Systems Behavioral Scale; FrsBe subscales include:
Apathy, Disinhibition, and Executive Functioning; RBANS = Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status; AQ = Awareness
Questionnaire – Self-report form; ERN = Adaptive mean amplitude (!V) for the error related negativity; Pe = Adaptive mean amplitude (!V) for unaware and
aware error trials of the post-error positivity. Unaware Error Rate is the arcsine-transformed proportion of total errors that were unaware errors. All subscales
and Total scale correlations from the FrSBe are from post-injury self-ratings. The Apathy composite consists of a subset of AES questions compiled following a
factor analysis showing specific questions which loaded on an apathy-related factor from both the AES and the BDI-II completed by Kirsch-Darrow et al. (2011).
* - p < .05, ** - p < .01.
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Table 13
Hierarchical Regression Model with Arcsine-Transformed Unaware Error Proportion as the Dependent Variable
B

B (Std. Err.)

!

t

p-value

Partial R

VIF

Apathy

-.02

.01

-.34

-2.07

.05

-.43

1.01

RBANS Total Score

-.01

.01

-.41

-1.93

.07

-.40

1.75

LOC Duration

.00

.00

-.36

-1.46

.16

-.32

2.33

PTA Duration

.00

.00

.60

2.82

.01

.54

1.70

Note. Loss of consciousness (LOC) and post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) duration were calculated in hours. The
symbol “B” represents unstandardized coefficients while “!” is the standardized coefficient. Partial R is the
correlation between the predicted variable and the predictor variable when controlling for all other predictors.

Tables 14 and 15 contain regression-specific data related to ERN and Pe amplitude as dependent
variables. Figures 10 and 11 are scatter plots of apathy scores and ERN and Pe amplitudes.
Relative to Hypothesis 2 of Aim 2, the model predicting ERN amplitude was not significant,
F(4,14) = 2.86, p = .06, R2 = 45.0%. The model predicting Pe amplitude was nonsignificant,
F(4,14) = 0.39, p = .81, R2 = 10.1%.

Unaware Error Proportion
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Apathy
Figure 9. Scree plot of apathy scores and unaware error proportions from the M/S TBI group. Unaware error
proportions are arcsine-transformed allowing for improved distribution normality and scores above 1.00.
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Table 14
Hierarchical Regression Model with ERN Amplitude as the Dependent Variable
B

B (Std. Err.)

!

t

p-value

Partial R

VIF

Apathy

-.07

1.51

-.22

-1.09

.29

-.28

1.05

RBANS Total Score

-.07

.01

.85

3.22

.01

.65

1.77

LOC Duration

.00

.00

.44

1.33

.21

.34

2.79

PTA Duration

.00

.00

.06

0.21

.84

.06

2.10

Note. Loss of consciousness (LOC) and post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) duration were calculated in hours. The
symbol “B” represents unstandardized coefficients while “!” is the standardized coefficient. Partial R is the
correlation between the predicted variable and the predictor variable when controlling for all other predictors.

Table 15
Hierarchical Regression Model with Pe Amplitude as the Dependent Variable
B

B (Std. Err.)

!

t

p-value

Partial R

VIF

Apathy

.02

.11

.05

.18

.86

.05

1.05

RBANS Total Score

.02

.02

.29

.85

.41

.22

1.77

LOC Duration

.00

.00

.16

.38

.71

.10

2.79

PTA Duration

.00

.00

-.21

-.58

.57

-.15

2.07

Note. Loss of consciousness (LOC) and post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) duration were calculated in hours. The
symbol “B” represents unstandardized coefficients while “!” is the standardized coefficient. Partial R is the
correlation between the predicted variable and the predictor variable when controlling for all other predictors.

ERN Amplitude
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Apathy

Pe Amplitude

Figure 10. Scree plot of apathy scores and ERN amplitudes from the M/S TBI group.

Apathy

Figure 11. Scree plot of apathy scores and Pe amplitudes from the M/S TBI group.
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Discussion
The purpose of this dissertation was to provider greater understanding of the role of
apathy in cognitive control and specifically error awareness in those with M/S TBI. I intended to
add to the growing body of error awareness in M/S TBI literature by looking at how levels of
self-reported apathy influenced electrophysiological and behavioral measures of error awareness.
This study aimed to determine: first, if there were group differences on electrophysiological and
behavior indicators of conscious error awareness, and; second the relationship of apathy with the
same indices of error awareness. The study hypotheses were: (1) that those with M/S TBI would
have fewer aware errors (measured through the proportion of aware to unaware errors) than
controls; (2) that there would be group differences between the M/S TBI group and controls for
Pe component amplitudes on aware trials and ERN component amplitudes on unaware error
trials; (3) that increased levels of apathy would be associated with a higher proportion of
unaware to aware errors for the M/S TBI group; and (4) that higher apathy levels would be
associated with decreased Pe and ERN component amplitudes in the M/S TBI group.
Findings from this study include an older M/S TBI than control group, as well as
increased levels of apathy and depression, and decreased neuropsychological functioning for the
M/S TBI group compared to control participants. Groups were similar on electrophysiological
indicators of error awareness. However, the M/S TBI group had better early-task accuracy than
controls, which decreased over time, whereas the control group improved performance over time
completing the task. Awareness of color errors improved for both groups, but awareness of
repeat errors only improved for control participants over time. Apathy predicted the proportion
of unaware errors for the M/S TBI group, but in the opposite direction as expected.
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In general, the results of the current study were mixed. Results indicated some
significant differences between the groups on behavioral measures related to accuracy and error
awareness. However, relative to the first hypothesis, there was not a difference between-groups
on the proportion of aware errors when looking at performance over the entire task. Differences
began to emerge only when looking at levels of error awareness and accuracy over time by
comparing early task performance with later task performance. Results show that individuals in
the M/S TBI group started the task with better accuracy for color and repeat trials and either
decreased their level of performance, as was the case for color trials, or maintained similar
performance for repeat trials. In comparison, controls started with relatively lower accuracy than
the M/S TBI group for both types of trials and improved to similar levels as the M/S TBI group.
The pattern of change in error awareness and accuracy indicated that the M/S TBI group started
out more accurate and less aware of errors than controls, but performance decreased or stayed the
same while control accuracy and awareness increased.
The results of differential awareness as a function of group and time on the task are
mixed relative to previous work in the area of error awareness in a M/S TBI sample. Similar to
previous studies, results from the current study show improvements in RTs across groups over
time (M. J. Larson et al., 2007; 2009; M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009); however, current results
showed significant accuracy differences between groups over time. Previous studies did not look
at differential task performance in the early and late halves of their respective tasks. Current
findings show no differences between groups when looking at the entire EAT, but analyses
comparing early and late performance between groups show significant behavioral differences
over time. The group differences over time provide evidence to support accuracy and awareness
differences between M/S TBI and control groups that may not conflict with previous studies, and
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may provide some additional support for their findings. An interesting question would be to
reanalyze the previous awareness datasets (e.g., M.J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009) to determine if
there were behavioral accuracy differences between groups at different time points in the task.
Taken together, results form early-to-late analyses support Aim 1 Hypothesis 1, in that on
behavioral measures there were group differences between the TBI and control groups, but only
as a function of time completing the task.
The findings that the M/S TBI group had decreasing accuracy over time while controls
improved their accuracy, connected with increased awareness of color errors in both groups
indicates that the M/S TBI group was possibly attending less to errors. A conclusion of
decreased attention comes from the finding that the M/S TBI group was making more errors at
the end of the task, potentially a result of attentional slips leading to decreased performance. The
M/S TBI group improved awareness of errors for color trials indicating that, despite initial errors
of commission, they improved their evaluative performance monitoring ability at a similar rate as
controls. However, the M/S TBI group did not correct and regulate performance in the same
way as controls. Not only did the M/S TBI group not correct and improve their performance
over time in the same way as controls, for color trials they actually got worse. The decrease in
performance indicates that whereas the M/S TBI group did successfully evaluate performance
through increasing error awareness, they did not regulate that performance, as accuracy
decreased over time. Maintenance of evaluative monitoring but not regulative improvements
relates back to the Crosson et al. (1989) model of awareness in that whereas the M/S TBI group
had intellectual awareness of errors at a level allowing error recognition they did not develop
awareness at the level of emergent or anticipatory awareness. By not developing emergent or
anticipatory awareness they were unable improve performance in the moment of the color or
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repeat no-go trial, and were unable to anticipate and make cognitive changes to plan how to
improve future performance on similar no-go trials.
One potential explanation for why the TBI group became less accurate as the task
progressed, but became more aware of errors may be related to deficits in attention. Whereas
controls showed improved performance and error awareness over time due to better attentional
abilities and a lack of attentional slips. In comparison to controls, the M/S TBI group was unable
to adjust performance sufficiently to improve accuracy. This discrepancy is most likely related
to deficits in emergent and anticipatory awareness (see the Crosson et al., 1989 model of
awareness in the Introduction) where higher levels of awareness may not be accessible to the
M/S TBI group due to associated deficits in sustained attention (Lamme, 2003; McAvinue et al.,
2005). The M/S TBI group did not attend well enough to the task to stop them from making
errors on similar types of trials as they were happening. However, increases in error awareness
signify that they recognized the error, but only after it had occurred and not in a way that they
could attend sufficiently to prevent a similar error in the future. Whereas RBANS-measured
attention was similar between the M/S TBI and control groups, the severe TBI group
demonstrated impaired attention when compared to controls. Despite the measured attentional
discrepancies there is cause to question if the RBANS was measuring the same type of attention
and vigilance as is required for constant monitoring of performance. Based on considerable
evidence from research into the subscales of the RBANS, it is my contention that the RBANS
does not address the issue of attending to and being conscious of performance deficits in those
with TBI in real-world settings.
A contention about the RBANS Attention subscale is based on the types of tasks included
in the Attention subscale and the wide variety of abilities that can fall under the construct of
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attention such as mental control, working memory, hemi-neglect, focused attention, and divided
attention (Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Convergent validity analysis of the Attention subscale
indicates poor validity in that it is not significantly correlated with other measures of attention
such as the Trailmaking Test A and B and Line Cancellation (E. Larson, Kirschner, Bode,
Heinemann, & Goodman, 2005). However, the tests comprising the Attention subscale, Digit
Span and Coding, do correlate highly with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III Working
Memory index (Gold, Queern, Iannone, & Buchanan, 1999). It can be safely concluded that
while working memory is an important aspect of attention other aspects of attention such as
vigilance, sustained attention, and mental control are more involved in task and error monitoring
once initial requirements have been learned in the EAT, and the Attention subscale of the
RBANS may not adequately represent those aspects of attention.
Two hypotheses from M/S TBI group results lead to further research questions: 1)
deficits in complex attentional processes may lead to results showing differential patterns in
accuracy, and 2) attentional deficits may be associated with decreased levels of error awareness
over time for the M/S TBI group despite similar physiological responses as controls to errors.
The question of whether or not complex attentional processes are leading to decreased error
awareness is an interesting question that has received some support. No-go errors (false positive
button presses) during the Sustained Attention and Response Task (a task similar to the EAT, but
with a focus on sustained attention over time) were associated with impaired error awareness,
suggesting that lapses in sustained attention or inhibition may result in greater numbers of
unaware errors (McAvinue et al., 2005). Of note is that TBI survivors who have DAI,
particularly to the white matter innervating the frontal lobes, exhibit similar patterns of executive
and attentional deficits as those with various focal frontal lesions (Dockree & Robertson, 2011;
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Stuss, 1998). Executive deficits can be seen through deficits in sustained attention, inhibition of
prepotent responses, and monitoring of environmental changes. All of these are processes that
may be employed during a specific task (Stuss, 2011), such as the EAT task. Sustained attention,
inhibition of prepotent responses, and monitoring of environmental changes draw upon resources
from the environment and/or require endogenous behavioral control to maintain a goal-directed
focus, which can be compromised following a TBI and lead to increased attentional lapses and
decreased awareness of errors (O'Keeffe, Dockree, Moloney, Carton, & Robertson, 2007).
O’Keeffe et al. (2007) proposed that more cognitively simple tasks will increase the challenge of
maintaining attention and alertness to combat the monotony of the task, but more cognitively
challenging tasks will be more stimulating and increase alertness to task demands.
The EAT task does have increased initial cognitive demands compared to later in the
task, in that the person must learn and remember two competing rules and various instructions
related to the signaling of an aware error. Results show that participants were able to quickly
master those rules and procedures without difficulty, as evidenced by the fact that all but one
severe TBI participant were able to learn the task requirements on the first practice session. Due
to the length of the task and the speed at which stimuli are presented cognitive demands, while
not reduced, may wane once participants are engaged in the task due to monotony and fatigue.
There is some automation of responses with the majority of trials being go-trials, potentially
resulting in difficulty maintaining attention and vigilance to performance. The characterization
of decreased awareness of errors due to attentional drift is consistent with other studies in M/S
TBI survivors (Dockree & Robertson, 2011; McAvinue et al., 2005; O'Keeffe et al., 2007).
Results suggest a similarity between groups on electrophysiological measures of error
awareness. For the ERPS, the Pe component showed significant differences for awareness
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demonstrating increased amplitude Pe for aware compared to unaware errors—consistent with
previous findings (Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; O'Connell et al., 2007).
Contrary to Hypotheses 2 of Aim 1, the findings from the Pe component, representing conscious
error awareness, showed no significant differences between the M/S TBI and control groups. A
lack of group differences on the Pe would seem to indicate that the Pe is intact in those with M/S
TBI and signals conscious awareness of errors. In other words, similar Pe amplitudes between
the M/S TBI group and controls indicates that both groups had similar electrophysiological
representations of conscious error awareness. There is some debate about whether or not the Pe
is a binary indicator of error awareness or if it corresponds to error awareness inputs from other
sources such as the ERN (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005a; Shalgi & Deouell,
2013; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). Elevated Pe amplitude is thought to represent awareness of
errors with amplitudes of unaware errors being similar to correct responses (Hughes & Yeung,
2011; Riesel, Weinberg, Endrass, Meyer, & Hajcak, 2013), as is the case in this study.
Analogous to current findings, the Pe component did not differentiate between TBI and controls
in other studies not related to conscious error awareness (M. J. Larson et al., 2007; 2009).
However, previous results also show that levels of deficit awareness drawn from differences in
self-reported and significant other-reported deficit awareness are positively correlated with Pe
amplitudes (M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009). Further work is needed to confirm if awareness of
deficits correlates with conscious awareness of errors in real time evaluation of the Pe
component of the ERP.
The ERN, in contrast, had several significant between-groups differences. Notably,
however, a visual inspection of the grand average waveforms for the ERN component did not
match with expected waveform characteristics and brings into question the validity of the ERN
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component in this study. The ERN component waveforms, while present, do not have similar
overall ERN component amplitude differences between error and correct trials that are typically
seen with this component. For example, one recent study using healthy controls found average
ERN amplitudes to be -0.3"V, with a difference between ERN and correct trials to be -1.6"V
(M. J. Larson, Steffen, & Primosch, 2013). The current study found an ERN/correct trial
average difference of -0.16"V across groups with a mean ERN of -0.43"V for the TBI group and
0.53"V for controls. The difference between the current ERN and comparable ERNs from other
studies is that the current ERN component shows a 10 times reduction in difference between
correct and error trials. A decreased differentiation between correct and error trials could be due
to the introduction of two competing no-go conditions (repeat and color-congruent trials) in the
EAT, resulting in a higher degree of uncertainty for correct trials and therefore increased
activation of monitoring processes (O'Connell et al., 2007).
Previous research shows that the ERN is affected by task requirements, with many
different types of tasks being employed across studies to elicit the ERN. The use of multiple
different tasks resulted in multiple variations of the ERN component with varying conclusions
about the role of the ERN in error awareness (Gründler, Cavanagh, Figueroa, Frank, & Allen,
2009; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009a; Riesel et al., 2013). For example, Grundler et al. (2009) found
ERN amplitude differences between patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder when
comparing across a more complex probabilistic learning task and a less complex responseconflict flanker task. Results indicated that the flanker task resulted in more elevated ERN
amplitudes than with the probabilistic learning task. Riesel et al. (2013) compared ERN and Pe
component characteristics from healthy controls on three different tasks commonly used to study
the ERN and Pe components: a modified flanker, a go/no-go, and a Stroop task. They found
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behavioral performance differences between the three tasks as well as component amplitude
differences, with the stroop task showing the most attenuated ERN amplitudes when compared to
the other two tasks. Riesel et al. (2013) related the decrease in ERN amplitude to task difficulty,
with the Stroop task being the most difficult of the three compared tasks. The finding that task
difficulty is negatively correlated with ERN amplitude is consistent with several other studies
(Falkenstein, 2004; Hoffmann & Falkenstein, 2010; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). The current
study employed the EAT as a task designed to elicit the ERN and Pe components. The EAT is a
hybrid Stroop and go/no-go task with complex instructions and multiple rules and procedures for
participants to remember. Such extensive task requirements increase the difficulty of the task
and the cognitive resources needed to adequately complete the task. It is highly probable, given
previously mentioned results from other studies, that there is a continuum where increasing task
difficulty relates to decreasing ERN amplitude, and the EAT is higher on that continuum than
other more common tasks.
It may also be the case that the EAT does not elicit strong ERN components due to the
conscious monitoring nature of the task. Attenuated and lower amplitude ERN components have
been reported when using the EAT and connected to continued error processing at a conscious
level across trials, signaling and supporting continued performance adjustments (O'Connell et al.,
2007). Furthermore, evidence supports the ERN as part of a broader error-awareness and
performance-monitoring system. Hewig et al. (2011) indicated that the ERN is necessary, but
not sufficient for there to be full error recognition at a conscious level, and Charles et al. (2013)
supported that the ERN reflects only part of an error-awareness hierarchy.
Another possibility for why there was a diminished ERN could be due to elevated levels
of depression in the TBI group, with depression shown to attenuate ERN component amplitudes
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(M. J. Larson et al., 2009; M. J. Larson, Perlstein, Stigge-Kaufman, Kelly, & Dotson, 2006).
This is an unlikely possibility due to the fact that ERN amplitudes were more attenuated in the
control group and although the TBI group was the group with higher levels of reported
depression, levels were below clinical cutoffs.
With respect to the role that apathy plays in error awareness for survivors of M/S TBI
from Aim 2, Hypothesis 1, apathy did significantly predict the proportion of unaware errors, but
not in the hypothesized direction. The model indicated that as apathy increased the proportion of
unaware errors decreased. In other words, the more apathetic a person with M/S TBI was the
more awareness they had of errors. Previous findings indicated that apathy results in reduced
goal-directed behavior through impairments of multiple executive processes such as inhibition,
set shifting, and rule finding (Arnould et al., 2013). Additionally, apathy negatively affects
maintenance and sustaining of attention in those with TBI (Arnould et al., 2013). Given these
previous findings connecting apathy to other cognitive functions it would seem likely that there
would be a positive and not a negative relationship between apathy and error awareness.
Relative to Aim 2, Hypothesis 2, apathy was not a significant predictor of ERN nor Pe
amplitudes. Findings showing that increases in apathy did not predict decreases in ERN
amplitudes could have several possible interpretations. First, previously discussed concerns
about the nature of the ERN and reliability of the current ERN waveforms put the validity of
these results in question. Further study and replication is needed to confirm this result. I would
expect that future studies find results showing that apathy does predict ERN amplitudes, with
potential interpretations related to the role of the ERN. The most common of these
interpretations is that the ERN component signals response conflict and represents a precursor to
conscious error detection (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). Thus, reduced ERN amplitude would
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likely be predicted by increased apathy meaning that as apathy levels increase, salience of
competing responses signaled as errors would reliably decrease, resulting in attenuated ERN
amplitudes. Essentially, errors are less significant to those with higher levels of apathy.
The finding that apathy did not significantly predict Pe amplitudes relates back to
previously reported findings and characterization of the Pe as a binary indication of error
awareness (Shalgi & Deouell, 2013). Elevated Pe amplitude is thought to represent awareness of
errors with unaware errors being similar to correct responses (Hughes & Yeung, 2011; Riesel et
al., 2013), as was found in this study. However, previous results show that levels of deficit
awareness are positively correlated with Pe amplitudes with inferences drawn between selfreported deficit awareness on the FrSBe and error awareness (M. J. Larson & Perlstein, 2009),
but negative affect measured by a composite of depression and anxiety measures did not
significantly predict Pe amplitudes (M. J. Larson et al., 2011). As apathy has been shown to be a
different construct than depression (Kirsch-Darrow et al., 2006; 2011), and can be classified as a
substantial decrease or lack of affect and emotion there is insufficient evidence to believe that
elevated apathy levels would influence Pe amplitudes in the same way as negative affect.
Limitations
One important limitation of this study is the nature of the sample itself. There is a high
degree of heterogeneity in the TBI sample in the areas of injury severity, cognitive functioning,
and awareness of deficits. The broad range of characteristics within the TBI sample is indicative
of real-world characteristics of the TBI population and the variety of presentations that can be
seen from survivors of M/S TBI. Such real-world representation provides generalizability to the
population as a whole. However, a heterogeneous sample in terms of injury severity and
associated awareness limits the ability to detect differences and provide specific conclusions.
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There is a concern that the M/S TBI group was cognitively similar to controls as the only
differences in cognitive functioning were related to worse language performance for the M/S
TBI group. I was able to show that there were broader cognitive differences between controls
and the severe TBI group in overall decreased cognitive functioning as well as specific language
and attentional deficits for the severe TBI group. These differences lead to a potential greater
degree of confidence in the results from the severe TBI group analyses and comparisons, but also
lead to a question related to sample size and available power from the smaller severe TBI
sample. The answer to the power question will require study replication with a larger severe TBI
sample.
Another sample-related limitation is that participants were found through convenience
methods and from a highly educated population. Sample recruitment may have played a role in
the limited differences seen between M/S TBI and controls in that there were pre-injury factors
such as education, health, and fitness levels that could be affecting results. Whereas there were
no differences between groups on level of education, samples represent a population with higher
education completion and/or aspirations as a majority of both samples were gathered from BYU
and the surrounding area. Multiple studies have shown that education level is a significant
predictor of functional and cognitive outcomes following M/S TBI (L. C. Davis et al., 2012; Jeon
et al., 2008; Novack, Bush, Meythaler, & Canupp, 2001). However, the use of the WTAR in this
study shows that education levels in both groups are estimated to be similar and not above
average levels. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that there were premorbid intellectual
differences between groups leading to a high level of recovery in the M/S TBI group.
The current sample had a wide range of injury severity that may have impacted the
reliability of findings. However, in order to account for this we completed analyses with only
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the severe TBI group, where appropriate. In the case of apathy, where we were comparing the
severe TBI group to a control group the sample size was notably smaller and likely played a role
in the results found. Future studies with a more homogeneous severe TBI sample are needed to
further elucidate the role of apathy in the complex process of error awareness. The use of
measures that test both broad executive skills and specific facets of attention will provide more
understanding to the relationship between attention, apathy, and error awareness, as I found no
differences in electrophysiological indicators of error awareness.
Related to the sample characteristics is the fact that several of the TBI participants were
unable or unwilling to provide access to medical records and/or requests for medical records to
providers were not answered. Additionally, some records that were received did not contain
sufficient information to adequately document injury severity and required clinical interpretation
to extrapolate severity. For example, one record noted, “there was decreased GCS during
transportation,” with no further information related to whether the decrease was to a 14 or to a
three on the Glasgow Coma Scale. In situations where medical records were not available or
insufficient a comprehensive retrospective interview was completed with the participant and
available family members.
A lack of pertinent medical records does have implications for generalizability and
reliability of study findings in that it reduces confidence that some of the participants met study
injury severity criteria. This deficit in confidence applies more specifically to the participants
classified as having a moderate TBI as they are closer to the lower end of the severity spectrum
and often did not have sufficient medical records documenting injury severity. To address this
concern I attempted to complete as many analyses as possible with only the severe TBI

82
participants to ensure that severity was not playing a factor in results and ultimately the
conclusions made from those results.
I note that while medical records do provide additional confirmation of severity there are
potential confounds in using indices such as GCS and LOC for severity classification due to
medical procedures such as intubation, induced coma, and surgery (Lezak et al., 2012). Lezak et
al. (2012) reported that it is not uncommon to see misclassification for someone with an initially
high GCS or little or no LOC who later has deterioration of mental status due to delayed
hematoma, cerebral edema, or other trauma related problems. They further note that PTA is used
in clinical settings as a reliable measure of injury severity as it correlates well with GCS ratings
(Levin, Benton, & Grossman, 1982). Further, it was concluded that fine-tuned accuracy of PTA
duration was not necessary and that larger estimates of time in hours, days, and weeks is
sufficient for clinical documentation (Lezak et al., 2012). As the medical records obtained in this
study are from clinical settings they follow this pattern of larger estimates of PTA and are similar
to reports from the participants themselves in level of specificity for estimating both LOC and
PTA (King et al., 1997; McMillan et al., 1996). There are additional classification systems
proposed for research purposes with greater sensitivity to distinguish between moderate and
severe TBI participants; however; those systems were not available for this study (Lezak et al.,
2012).
Another potential limitation of the current study was the exploratory use of the EAT task
with a M/S TBI sample. There has been no previous use of this type of task with this population
and there will need to be replication in order to determine reliability of results. However, the
EAT has been successfully used in fMRI studies with chronic substance abuse populations
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(Hester et al., 2007; 2009), and in healthy controls for previous ERP studies with similar results
across studies (O'Connell et al., 2007; Orr & Hester, 2012).
One question that has been addressed relative to the EAT task requirements relates to the
motor response and increased activation due to having to press an alternate button when
signaling error awareness following an error. The concern being that by having increased motor
activation and response options there could be contamination of the error awareness activations.
Hester, et al., (2005) addressed this concern and demonstrated that differences between aware
and unaware responses were unrelated to the awareness signaling process through the use of an
oddball task where they had participants respond in an identical fashion as they would to aware
errors, but removed the error component from the task by having participants press the
awareness button following a neutral stimuli. The EAT task was also tested using electrodermal
skin conductance to show that the secondary awareness response did not contaminate the
electrophysiological indicators of error awareness (O'Connell et al., 2007).
Future Directions
One potential direction would be to replicate current study findings with a larger sample
of TBI participants, ideally with more severe TBI participants or only severe TBI participants.
By including a larger sample with more severe TBI participants, results could be strengthened
and confirmed, especially those results showing trend-level significance such as repeat error
awareness. Similarly, by applying the EAT to other samples of TBI participants, there would be
further data adding to the growing body of literature supporting task-related differences in
electrophysiological and behavioral indices of error awareness. For example, there is growing
evidence supporting that ERN amplitudes are task-dependent and related to task difficulty
(Riesel et al., 2013).
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Another area where further study is needed is in the area of apathy and its connection to
error awareness evidenced through electrophysiological indices, specifically the Pe component.
Previous evidence showing that increased awareness of deficits correlates with elevated Pe
amplitudes and increased negative affect predicts reduced Pe amplitudes in those with a M/S TBI
compared to controls (M. J. Larson et al., 2009) could be expanded to include indices of
conscious error awareness and detection through use of the EAT task or similar tasks requiring
error signaling. Similarly, more research is needed in order to delineate the role that apathy
plays in error awareness and how a substantial decrease in emotion and motivation contributes
differently than negative affect. Determining the role of apathy could be further explored
through the use of a simpler task, such as a flanker task, to determine first if task requirements
contributed to a lack of findings in the current study relative to a relationship between apathy and
the Pe component. Additionally, by comparing participants with elevated levels of apathy, but
not negative affect on indices of error awareness using an error awareness task would provide
information about how these two constructs influence error awareness. For example, the use of
various populations where apathy has been found separate from depression, such as in
Parkinson’s Disease and M/S TBI, would be good populations from which to gather participants.
Summary and Conclusions
In this dissertation I found that individuals with M/S TBI have a different process of error
awareness using behavioral measures than healthy controls. Behavioral results indicated that the
M/S TBI group showed decreases in accuracy over time while control participants improved
their accuracy. Awareness of errors remained constant or improved overtime for both groups.
Conclusions from these results support that those with M/S TBI demonstrate deficits in higherlevel awareness and regulative attention restricting them from modifying performance.
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Behavioral differences were not replicated in the electrophysiological responses of error-related
ERP components, specifically the ERN and the Pe. The lack of differential findings related to
the ERP components was interpreted to mean that the M/S TBI group was attending less to or
less aware of their errors at a regulative level, but when they were able to attend they had similar
physiological responses as healthy controls. Whereas the Pe was seen as consistent with previous
research, the ERN component was not reliably produced in this study and results related to the
ERN should be interpreted cautiously. However, there is evidence to support that task
requirements may be responsible for reduced amplitude ERN components and error versus
correct differences across groups. Replication is needed to determine if the ERN components
produced in this study were a result of some set of task requirements.
I found that apathy was counter intuitively predictive of increases in error awareness
behaviorally. More research in this area is needed to delineate potential implications of elevated
apathy and decreased attentional processes in survivors of M/S TBI.
In conclusion, findings from the current dissertation show differences in error awareness
processes between M/S TBI participants and neurologically-healthy controls. Differences are
related to variations in no-go accuracy and error awareness occurring over time and not
delineated by comparisons of an entire task. The awareness model presented by Crosson (1989)
provides a viable framework for understanding the deficits in performance from the M/S TBI
group indicating that awareness at an intellectual level is most likely intact and accounts for
maintenance of error awareness. However, higher-level emergent and anticipatory awareness are
impaired due to attentional deficits resulting in decreased accuracy in the M/S TBI group over
time. The current dissertation provides support for continued exploration of performance across
task duration and the effects of task requirements on behavioral and electrophysiological
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indicators of error awareness. The current dissertation also sets the stage for future research into
the role of apathy in attention and error awareness for those with a M/S TBI potentially leading
to clinical research aimed at improving rehabilitation efforts.
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